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Abstract
This is a set of lecture notes for the course “Mathematical Foundations of
Computation”, which I taught at the University of Ottawa in Fall 2001. Top-
ics covered in these notes include the untyped lambda calculus, the Church-
Rosser theorem, the simply-typed lambda calculus, the Curry-Howard iso-
morphism, weak and strong normalization, type inference, denotational se-
mantics, complete partial orders, and the language PCF.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Extensional vs. intensional view of functions
What is a function? In modern mathematics, the prevalent notion is that of “func-
tions as graphs”: each function f has a ﬁxed domain X and codomain Y , and a
function f : X ! Y is a set of pairs f  X  Y such that for each x 2 X, there
exists exactly one y 2 Y such that (x;y) 2 f. Two functions f;g : X ! Y are
considered equal if they yield the same output on each input, i.e., f(x) = g(x) for
all x 2 X. This is called the extensional view of functions, because it speciﬁes
that the only thing observable about a function is how it maps inputs to outputs.
However, before the 20th century, functions were rarely looked at in this way.
An older notion of functions as that of “functions as rules”. In this view, to give
a function means to give a rule for how the function is to be calculated. Often,
such a rule can be given by a formula, for instance, the familiar f(x) = x 2 or
g(x) = sin(ex) from calculus. As before, two functions are extensionally equal if
they have the same input-output behavior; but now we can also speak of another
notion of equality: two functions are intensionally1 equal if they are given by
(essentially) the same formula.
When we think of functions as given by formulas, it is not always necessary to
know the domain and codomain of a function. Consider for instance the function
f(x) = x. This is, of course, the identity function. We may regard it as a function
f : X ! X for any set X.
In most of mathematics, the “functions as graphs” paradigm is the most elegant
1Note that this word is intentionally spelled “intensionally”.
4andappropriate way of dealingwith functions. Graphs deﬁnea more general class
of functions, because it includes functions that are not necessarily given by a rule.
Thus, when we prove a mathematical statement such as “any differentiable func-
tion is continuous”, we really mean this is true all functions (in the mathematical
sense), not just those functions for which a rule can be given.
On the other hand, in computer science, the “functions as rules” paradigm is often
more appropriate. Think of a computer program as deﬁning a function which
maps input to output. Most computer programmers (and users) do not only care
about the extensional behavior of a program (which inputs are mapped to which
outputs), but also about how the output is calculated: How much time does it
take? How much memory and disk space is used in the process? How much
communication bandwidth is used? These are intensional questions having to do
with the particular way in which a function was deﬁned.
1.2 The lambda calculus
The lambda calculus is a theory of functions as formulas. It is a system for ma-
nipulating functions as expressions.
Let us begin by looking at another well-known language of expressions, namely
arithmetic. Arithmetic expressions are made up from variables (x;y;z:::), num-
bers (1;2;3;:::), and operators (“+”, “ ”, “” etc.). An expression such as x+y
stands for the result of an addition (as opposed to an instruction to add, or the
statement that something is being added). The great advantage of this language
is that expressions can be nested without any need to mention the intermediate
results explicitly. So for instance, we write
A = (x + y)  z2;
and not
let w = x + y, then let u = z2, then let A = w  u.
The latter notation would be tiring and cumbersome to manipulate.
The lambda calculus extends the idea of an expression language to include func-
tions. Where we normally write
Let f be the function x 7! x2. Then consider A = f(5),
in the lambda calculus we just write
A = (x:x2)(5):
5The expression x:x2 stands for the function that maps x to x2 (as opposed to the
statement that x is being mapped to x2). As in arithmetic, we use parentheses to
group terms.
It is understood that the variable x is a local variable in the term x:x2. Thus, it
does not make any difference if we write y:y2 instead. A local variable is also
called a bound variable.
One advantage of the lambda notation is that it allows us to easily talk about
higher-order functions, i.e., functions whose inputs and/or outputs are themselves
functions. An example is the operation f 7! f  f in mathematics, which takes a
function f and maps it to f  f, the composition of f with itself. In the lambda
calculus, f  f is written as
x:f(f(x));
and the operation that maps f to f  f is written as
f:x:f(f(x)):
The evaluation of higher-order functions can get somewhat complex; as an exam-
ple, consider the following expression:
 
(f:x:f(f(x)))(y:y2)

(5)
Convince yourself that this evaluates to 625. Another example is given in the
following exercise:
Exercise 1.1. Evaluate the lambda-expression
 
(f:x:f(f(f(x)))) (g:y:g(g(y)))

(z:z + 1)

(0):
We will soon introduce some conventions for reducing the number of parentheses
in such expressions.
1.3 Untyped vs. typed lambda-calculi
We have already mentioned that, when considering “functions as rules”, is not
always necessary to know the domain and codomain of a function ahead of time.
Thesimplest example is the identityfunction f = x:x, whichcanhaveanyset X
as its domain and codomain, as long as domain and codomain are equal. We say
that f has the type X ! X. Another example is the function g = f:x:f(f(x))
6which we encountered above. One can check that g maps any function f : X !
X to a function g(f) : X ! X. In this case, we say that the type of g is
(X ! X) ! (X ! X):
By being ﬂexible about domains and codomains, we are able to manipulate func-
tions in ways that would not be possible in ordinary mathematics. For instance, if
f = x:x is the identity function, then we have f(x) = x for any x. In particular,
we can take x = f, and we get
f(f) = (x:x)(f) = f:
Note that the equation f(f) = f never makes sense in ordinary mathematics,
since it is not possible (for set-theoretic reasons) for a function to be included in
its own domain.
As another example, let ! = x:x(x).
Exercise 1.2. What is !(!)?
We have several options regarding types in the lambda calculus.
 Untypedlambdacalculus. Intheuntypedlambdacalculus,weneverspecify
the type of any expression. Thus we never specify the domain or codomain
of any function. This gives us maximal ﬂexibility. It is also very unsafe,
because we might run into situations where we try to apply a function to an
argument that it does not understand.
 Simply-typed lambda calculus. In the simply-typed lambda calculus, we
always completely specifythe type of everyexpression. This is verysimilar
to the situation in set theory. We never allow the application of a function
to an argument unless the type of the argument is the same as the domain of
the function. Thus, terms such as f(f) are ruledout, evenif f is the identity
function.
 Polymorphically typed lambda calculus. This is an intermediate situation,
where we may specify, for instance, that a term has a type of the form
X ! X for all X, without actually specifying X.
As we will see, each of these alternatives has dramatically different properties
from the others.
72 The untyped lambda calculus
2.1 Syntax
The lambda calculus is a formal language. The expressions of the language are
called lambda terms, and we will give rules for manipulating them.
Deﬁnition. Assume given an inﬁnite set V of variables, denoted by x;y;z etc.
The set of lambda terms is given by the following Backus-Naur Form:
Lambda terms: M;N ::= x (MN) (x:M)
The above Backus-Naur Form (BNF) is a convenient abbreviation for the follow-
ing equivalent, more traditionally mathematical deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition. Assume given an inﬁnite set V of variables. Let A be an alphabet
consisting of the elements of V, and the special symbols “(”, “)”, “”, and “.”. Let
A be the set of strings (ﬁnite sequences) over the alphabet A. The set of lambda
terms is the smallest subset   A such that:
 Whenever x 2 V then x 2 .
 Whenever M;N 2  then (MN) 2 .
 Whenever x 2 V and M 2  then (x:M) 2 .
Comparing the two equivalent deﬁnitions, we see that the Backus-Naur Form is
a convenient notation because: (1) the deﬁnition of the alphabet can be left im-
plicit, (2) the use of distinct meta-symbols for different syntactic classes (x;y;z
for variables and M;N for terms) eliminates the need to explicitly quantify over
the sets V and . In the future, we will always present syntactic deﬁnitions in the
BNF style.
The following are some examples of lambda terms:
(x:x) ((x:(xx))(y:(yy))) (f:(x:(f(fx))))
Note that in the deﬁnition of lambda terms, we have built in enough mandatory
parentheses to ensure that every term M 2  can be uniquely decomposed into
subterms. This means, each term M 2  is of precisely one of the forms x,
(MN), (x:M). Terms of these three forms are called variables, applications,
and lambda abstractions, respectively.
8We usethenotation(MN), rather thanM(N), todenote theapplicationofafunc-
tion M to an argument N. Thus, in the lambda calculus, we write (fx) instead
of the more traditional f(x). This allows us to economize more efﬁciently on the
use of parentheses. To avoid having to write an excessive number of parentheses,
we establish the following conventions for writing lambda terms:
Convention.  We omit outermost parentheses. For instance, we write MN
instead of (MN).
 Applications associate to the left; thus, MNP means (MN)P. This is
convenient when applying a function to a number of arguments, as in fxyz,
which means ((fx)y)z.
 The body of a lambda abstraction (the part after the dot) extends as far
to the right as possible. In particular, x:MN means x:(MN), and not
(x:M)N.
 Multiple lambda abstractions can be contracted; thus xyz:M will abbre-
viate x:y:z:M.
It is important to note that this convention is only for notational convenience; it
does not affect the “ofﬁcial” deﬁnition of lambda terms.
2.2 Free and bound variables, -equivalence
In our informal discussion of lambda terms, we have already pointed out that the
terms x:x and y:y, which differ only in the name of their bound variable, are
essentially the same. We will say that such terms are -equivalent, and we write
M = N. In the rare event that we want to say that two terms are precisely equal,
symbol for symbol, we say that M and N are identical and we write M  N. We
reserve “=” as a generic symbol used for different purposes.
An occurrence of a variable x inside a term of the form x:N is said to be bound.
The corresponding x is called a binder, and we say that the subterm N is the
scope of the binder. A variable occurrence that is not bound is free. Thus, for
example, in the term
M = (x:xy)(y:yz);
x is bound, but z is free. The variable y has both a free and a bound occurrence.
The set of free variables of M is fy;zg.
9More generally, the set of free variables of a term M is denoted FV (M), and it is
deﬁned formally as follows:
FV (x) = fxg;
FV (MN) = FV (M) [ FV (N);
FV (x:M) = FV (M) n fxg:
This deﬁnitionis an example ofa deﬁnitionbyrecursiononterms. In otherwords,
in deﬁning FV (M), we assume that we have already deﬁned FV (N) for all
subterms of M. We will often encounter such recursive deﬁnitions, as well as
inductive proofs.
Before we can formally deﬁne -equivalence, we need to deﬁne what it means
to rename a variable in a term. If x;y are variables, and M is a term, we write
Mfy=xg for the result of renaming x as y in M. Renaming is formally deﬁned as
follows:
xfy=xg  y;
zfy=xg  z; if x 6= z,
(MN)fy=xg  (Mfy=xg)(Nfy=xg);
(x:M)fy=xg  y:(Mfy=xg);
(z:M)fy=xg  z:(Mfy=xg); if x 6= z.
Note that this kind of renaming replaces all occurrences of x by y, whether free,
bound, or binding. We will only apply it in cases where y does not already occur
in M.
Finally, we are in a position to formally deﬁne what it means for two terms to be
“the same up to renaming of bound variables”:
Deﬁnition. We deﬁne -equivalence to be the smallest congruence relation =
on lambda terms, such that for all terms M and all variables y that do not occur in
M,
x:M = y:(Mfy=xg):
Recall that a relation on lambda terms is an equivalence relation if it satisﬁes rules
(reﬂ), (symm), and (trans). It is a congruence if it also satisﬁes rules (cong) and
(). Thus, by deﬁnition, -equivalence is the smallest relation on lambda terms
satisfying the six rules in Table 1.
It is easy to prove by induction that any lambda term is -equivalent to another
term in which the names of all bound variables are distinct from each other and
from any free variables. Thus, when we manipulate lambda terms in theory and
10(reﬂ)
M = M
(symm) M = N
N = M
(trans) M = N N = P
M = P
(cong) M = M0 N = N0
MN = M0N0
() M = M0
x:M = x:M0
() y 62 M
x:M = y:(Mfy=xg)
Table 1: The rules for alpha-equivalence
in practice, we can (and will) always assume without loss of generality that bound
variables have been renamed to be distinct. This convention is called Barendregt’s
variable convention.
As a remark, the notions of free and bound variables and -equivalence are of
course not particular to the lambda calculus; they appear in many standard math-
ematical notations, as well as in computer science. Here are four examples where
the variable x is bound.
R 1
0 x2 dx
P10
x=1
1
x
limx!1 e x
int succ(int x) { return x+1; }
2.3 Substitution
In the previous section, we deﬁned a renaming operation, which allowed us to
replace a variable by another variable in a lambda term. Now we turn to a less
trivial operation, called substitution, which allows us to replace a variable by a
lambda term. We will write M[N=x] for the result of replacing x by N in M. The
deﬁnition of substitution is complicated by two circumstances:
1. We should only replace free variables. This is because the names of bound
variables are considered immaterial, and should not affect the result of a
substitution. Thus, x(xy:x)[N=x] is N(xy:x), and not N(xy:N).
112. We need to avoid unintended “capture” of free variables. Consider for ex-
ample the term M = x:yx, and let N = z:xz. Note that x is free in N
and bound in M. What should be the result of substituting N for y in M?
If we do this naively, we get
M[N=y] = (x:yx)[N=y] = x:Nx = x:(z:xz)x:
However, this is not what we intended, since the variable x was free in N,
and during the substitution, it got bound. We need to account for the fact
that the x that was bound in M was not the “same” x as the one that was
free in N. The proper thing to do is to rename the bound variable before the
substitution:
M[N=y] = (x0:yx0)[N=y] = x0:Nx0 = x0:(z:xz)x0:
Thus, the operation of substitution forces us to sometimes rename a bound vari-
able. In this case, it is best to pick a variable from V that has not been used yet as
the new name of the bound variable. A variable that is currently unused is called
fresh. The reason we stipulated that the set V is inﬁnite was to make sure a fresh
variable is always be available when we need one.
Deﬁnition. The (capture-avoiding) substitution of N for free occurrences of x in
M, in symbols M[N=x], is deﬁned as follows:
x[N=x] = N;
y[N=x] = y; if x 6= y,
(MP)[N=x] = (M[N=x])(P[N=x]);
(x:M)[N=x] = x:M;
(y:M)[N=x] = y:(M[N=x]); if x 6= y and y 62 FV (N),
(y:M)[N=x] = y0:(Mfy0=yg[N=x]); if x 6= y, y 2 FV (N), and y0 fresh.
This deﬁnition has one technical ﬂaw: in the last clause, we did not specify which
fresh variable to pick, and thus, technically, substitution is not well-deﬁned. One
way to solve this problem is to declare all lambda terms to be identiﬁed up to
-equivalence, and to prove that substitution is in fact well-deﬁned modulo -
equivalence. Another way would be to specify which variable y 0 to choose: for
instance, assume that there is a well-ordering on the set V of variables, and stipu-
late that y0 should be chosen to be the least variable which does not occur in either
M or N.
122.4 Introduction to -reduction
Convention. From now on, unless stated otherwise, we identify lambda terms up
to -equivalence. This means, when we speak of lambda terms being “equal”, we
meanthattheyare -equivalent. Formally,weregardlambdaterms as equivalence
classes modulo -equivalence. We will often use the ordinary equality symbol
M = N to denote -equivalence.
The process of evaluating lambda terms by “plugging arguments into functions”
is called -reduction. A term of the form (x:M)N, which consists of a lambda
abstraction applied to another term, is called a -redex. We say that it reduces
to M[N=x], and we call the latter term the reduct. We reduce lambda terms by
ﬁnding a subterm that is a redex, and then replacing that redex by its reduct. We
repeat this as many times as we like, or until there are no more redexes left to
reduce. A lambda term without any -redexes is said to be in -normal form.
For example, the lambda term (x:y)((z:zz)(w:w)) can be reducedas follows.
Here, we underline each redex just before reducing it:
(x:y)((z:zz)(w:w)) ! (x:y)((w:w)(w:w))
! (x:y)(w:w)
! y:
The last term, y, has no redexes and is thus in normal form. We could reduce the
same term differently, by choosing the redexes in a different order:
(x:y)((z:zz)(w:w)) ! y:
As we can see from this example:
- reducing a redex can create new redexes,
- reducing a redex can delete some other redexes,
- the number of steps that it takes to reach a normal form can vary, depending
on the order in which the redexes are reduced.
We can also see that the ﬁnal result, y, does not seem to depend on the order in
which the redexes are reduced. In fact, this is true in general, as we will prove
later.
If M and M 0 are terms such that M ! ! M0, and if M0 is in normal form, then
we say that M evaluates to M 0.
13Not every termevaluatesto something; some termscan bereduces foreverwithout
rachine a normal form. The following is an example:
(x:xx)(y:yyy) ! (y:yyy)(y:yyy)
! (y:yyy)(y:yyy)(y:yyy)
! :::
This example also shows that the size of a lambda term need not decrease during
reduction; it can increase, or remain the same. The term (x:xx)(x:xx), which
we encountered in Section 1, is another example of a lambda term which does not
reach a normal form.
2.5 Formal deﬁnitions of -reduction and -equivalence
The concept of -reduction can be deﬁned formally as follows:
Deﬁnition. We deﬁne single-step -reduction to be the smallest relation ! on
terms satisfying:
()
(x:M)N ! M[N=x]
(cong1) M ! M0
MN ! M0N
(cong2) N ! N0
MN ! MN0
()
M ! M0
x:M ! x:M0
Thus, M ! M0 iff M0 is obtained from M by reducing a single -redex of M.
Deﬁnition. We write M ! ! M0 if M reduces to M 0 in zero or more steps.
Formally, ! ! is deﬁned to be the reﬂexive transitive closure of !, i.e., the
smallest reﬂexive transitive relation containing !.
Finally, -equivalence is obtained by allowing reduction steps as well as inverse
reduction steps, i.e., by making ! symmetric:
Deﬁnition. We write M = M0 if M can be transformed into M 0 by zero or
more reduction steps and/or inverse reduction steps. Formally, =  is deﬁned to
be the reﬂexive symmetric transitive closure of !, i.e., the smallest equivalence
relation containing !.
14Exercise 2.1. This deﬁnition of -equivalence is slightly different from the one
given in class. Prove that they are in fact the same.
3 Programming in the untyped lambda calculus
One of the amazing facts about the untyped lambda calculus is that we can use it
to encode data, such as booleans and natural numbers, as well as programs that
operate on the data. This can be done purely within the lambda calculus, without
adding any additional syntax or axioms.
We will often have occasion to give names to particular lambda terms; we will
usually use boldface letters for such names.
3.1 Booleans
We begin by deﬁning two lambda terms to encode the truth values “true” and
“false”:
T = xy:x
F = xy:y
Let and be the term ab:abF. Verify the following:
and TT ! ! T
and TF ! ! F
and FT ! ! F
and FF ! ! F
Note that T and F are normal forms, so we can really say that a term such as
and TT evaluates to T. We say that and encodes the boolean function “and”. It
is understood that this coding is with respect to the particular coding of “true” and
“false”. We don’t claim that and MN evaluates to anything meaningful if M or
N are terms other than T and F.
Incidentially, there is nothing unique about the term ab:abF. It is one of many
possible ways of encoding the “and” function. Another possibility is ab:bab.
Exercise 3.1. Find lambda terms or and not which encode the boolean functions
“or” and “not”. Can you ﬁnd more than one term?
15Moreover, we deﬁne the term if then else = x:x. This term behaves like an
“if-then-else” function — speciﬁcally, we have
if then else TMN ! ! M
if then else FMN ! ! N
for all lambda terms M, N.
3.2 Natural numbers
If f and x are lambda terms, and n > 0 a natural number, write f nx for the term
f(f(:::(fx):::)), where f occurs n times. For each natural number n, we deﬁne
a lambda term n, called the nth Church numeral, as n = fx:f nx. Here are the
ﬁrst few Church numerals:
0 = fx:x
1 = fx:fx
2 = fx:f(fx)
3 = fx:f(f(fx))
:::
This particular way of encoding the natural numbers is due to Alonzo Church,
who was also the inventor of the lambda calculus. Note that 0 is in fact the same
term as F; thus, when interpreting a lambda term, we should know ahead of time
whether to interpret the result as a boolean or a numeral.
The successor function can be deﬁned as follows: succ = nfx:f(nfx). What
does this term compute when applied to a numeral?
succ n = (nfx:f(nfx))(fx:fnx)
! fx:f((fx:fnx)fx)
! fx:f(fnx)
= fx:fn+1x
= n + 1
Thus, we have proved that the term succ does indeed encode the successor func-
tion, when applied to a numeral. Here are possible deﬁnitions of addition and
multiplication:
add = nmfx:nf(mfx)
mult = nmf:n(mf):
16Exercise 3.2. (a) Manually evaluate the lambda terms add 23 and mult 23.
(b) Prove that add nm ! ! n + m, for all natural numbers n, m.
(c) Prove that mult nm ! ! n  m, for all natural numbers n, m.
Deﬁnition. Suppose f : Nk ! N is a k-ary function on the natural numbers, and
that M is a lambda term. We say that M (numeralwise) represents f if for all
n1;:::;nk 2 N,
M n1 :::nk ! ! f(n1;:::;nk):
This deﬁnition makes explicit what it means to be an “encoding”. We can say, for
instance, that the term add = nmfx:nf(mfx) represents the addition func-
tion. A deﬁnition generalizes easily to boolean functions, or functions of other
datatypes.
Often handy is the function iszero from natural numbers to booleans, which is
deﬁned by
iszero(0) = true
iszero(n) = false, if n 6= 0.
Convince yourself that the following term is a representation of this function:
iszero = nxy:n(z:y)x:
Exercise 3.3. Find lambda terms which represent eachof the followingfunctions:
(a) f(n) = (n + 3)2;
(b) f(n) =

true if n is even,
false if n is odd,
(c) exp(n;m) = nm;
(d) pred(n) = n   1:
We haveseen how to encode some simple boolean and arithmetic functions. How-
ever,we donotyethavea systematicmethodofconstructingsuchfunctions. What
we need is a mechanism for deﬁning more complicated functions from simple
ones. Consider for example the factorial function, deﬁned by:
0! = 1
n! = n  (n   1)!; if n 6= 0:
The encoding of such functions in the lambda calculus is the subject of the next
section. It is related to the concept of a ﬁxpoint.
173.3 Fixpoints and recursive functions
Suppose f is a function. We say that x is a ﬁxpoint of f if f(x) = x. In arithmetic
and calculus, some functions have ﬁxpoints, while others don’t. For instance,
f(x) = x2 has two ﬁxpoints 0 and 1, whereas f(x) = x + 1 has no ﬁxpoints.
Some functions have inﬁnitely many ﬁxpoints, notably f(x) = x.
We apply the notion of ﬁxpoints to the lambda calculus. If F and N are lambda
terms, we say that N is a ﬁxpoint of F if FN = N. The lambda calculus
contrasts with arithmetic in that every lambda term has a ﬁxpoint. This is perhaps
the ﬁrst surprising fact about the lambda calculus we learn in this course.
Theorem 3.1. In the untyped lambda calculus, every term F has a ﬁxpoint.
Proof. Let A = xy:y(xxy), anddeﬁne = AA. Nowsuppose F is anylambda
term, and let N = F. We claim that N is a ﬁxpoint of F. This is shown by the
following calculation:
N = F
= AAF
= (xy:y(xxy))AF
! ! F(AAF)
= F(F)
= FN:

The term  used in the proof is called Turing’s ﬁxpoint combinator.
The importance of ﬁxpoints lies in the fact that they allow us to solve equa-
tions. After all, ﬁnding a ﬁxpoint for f is the same thing as solving the equation
x = f(x). This covers equations with an arbitrary right-hand side, whose left-
hand side is x. From the above theorem, we know that we can always solve such
equations in the lambda calculus.
To see how to apply this idea, consider the question from the last section, namely,
how to deﬁne the factorial function. The most natural deﬁnition of the factorial
function is recursive, and we can write it in the lambda calculus as follows:
fact n = if then else(iszero n)(1)(mult n(fact(pred n)))
Here we have used various abbreviations for lambda terms that were introduced in
the previous section. The evident problem with a recursive deﬁnition such as this
18oneis that the termto be deﬁned, fact, appearsbothon theleft- andthe right-hand
side. In other words, to ﬁnd fact requires solving an equation!
We now apply our newfound knowledge of how to solve ﬁxpoint equations in the
lambda calculus. We start by rewriting the problem slightly:
fact = n:if then else(iszero n)(1)(mult n(fact(pred n)))
fact = (f:n:if then else(iszero n)(1)(mult n(f(pred n))))fact
Let us temporarily write F for the term
f:n:if then else(iszero n)(1)(mult n(f(pred n))):
Then the last equation becomes fact = F fact, which is a ﬁxpoint equation. We
can solve it up to -equivalence, by letting
fact = F
= (f:n:if then else(iszero n)(1)(mult n(f(pred n))))
Note that fact has disappeared from the right-hand side. The right-hand side is
a closed lambda term which represents the factorial function. (A lambda term is
called closed if it contains no free variables).
To see how this deﬁnition works in practice, let us evaluate fact 2. Recall from
the proof of Theorem 3.1 that F ! ! F(F), therefore fact ! ! F fact.
fact 2 ! ! F fact 2
! ! if then else(iszero 2)(1)(mult 2(fact(pred 2)))
! ! if then else(F)(1)(mult 2(fact(pred 2)))
! ! mult 2(fact(pred 2))
! ! mult 2(fact 1)
! ! mult 2(F fact 1)
! ! :::
! ! mult 2(mult 1(fact 0))
! ! mult 2(mult 1(F fact 0))
! ! mult 2(mult 1(if then else(iszero 0)(1)(mult 2(fact(pred 2)))))
! ! mult 2(mult 1(if then else(T)(1)(mult 2(fact(pred 2)))))
! ! mult 2(mult 11)
! ! 2
Note that this calculation, while messy, is completely mechanical. You can easily
convince yourself that fact 3 reduces to mult 3(fact 2), and therefore, by the
above calculation, to mult 32, and ﬁnally to 6. It is now a matter of a simple
induction to prove that fact n ! ! n!, for any n.
19Exercise 3.4. Write a lambda term which represents the Fibonacci function, de-
ﬁned by
f(0) = 1; f(1) = 1; f(n + 2) = f(n + 1) + f(n);for n > 2
Exercise 3.5. Write a lambda term which represents the characteristic function of
the prime numbers, i.e., f(n) = true if n is prime, and false otherwise.
Exercise 3.6. We have remarked at the beginning of this section that the number-
theoretic function f(x) = x + 1 does not have a ﬁxpoint. On the other hand, the
lambda term F = x:succ x, which represents the same function, does have a
ﬁxpoint by Theorem 3.1. How can you reconcile the two statements?
Exercise 3.7. The ﬁrst ﬁxpoint combinator for the lambda calculus was discov-
ered by Curry. Curry’s ﬁxpoint combinator, which is also called the paradoxical
ﬁxpoint combinator, is the term Y = f:(x:f(xx))(x:f(xx)).
(a) Prove that this is indeed a ﬁxpoint combinator, i.e., that YF is a ﬁxpoint of
F, for any term F.
(b) Turing’s ﬁxpoint combinator not only satisﬁes F = F(F), but also
F ! ! F(F). We used this fact in evaluating fact 2. Does an analo-
gous property hold for Y? Does this affect the outcome of the evaluation of
fact 2?
(c) Can you ﬁnd another ﬁxpoint combinator, besides Curry’s and Turing’s?
3.4 Other datatypes: pairs, tuples, lists, trees, etc.
So far, we have discussed lambda terms that represented functions on booleans
and natural numbers. However, it is easily possible to encode more general data
structures in the untyped lambda calculus. Pairs and tuples are of interest to ev-
erybody. The examples of lists and trees are primarily interesting to people with
experiencein a list-processinglanguage such as LISP orPROLOG; youcan safely
ignore these examples if you want to.
Pairs. If M and N are lambda terms, we deﬁne the pair hM;Ni to be the lambda
term z:zMN. We also deﬁne two terms left = p:p(xy:x) and right =
p:p(xy:y). We observe the following:
lefthM;Ni ! ! M
righthM;Ni ! ! N
20The terms left and right are called the left and right projections.
Tuples. Theencoding of pairs easily extends to arbitrary n-tuples. If M1;:::;Mn
areterms,wedeﬁnethen-tuplehM1;:::;Mniasthelambdatermz:zM1:::Mn,
and we deﬁne the ith projection n
i = p:p(x1 :::xn:xi). Then
n
i hM1;:::;Mni ! ! Mi;for all 1 6 i 6 n.
Lists. A list is different from a tuple, because its length is not necessarily ﬁxed.
A list is either empty (“nil”), or else it consists of a ﬁrst element (the “head”)
followed by another list (the “tail”). We write nil for the empty list, and H :: T
for the list whose head is H and whose tail is T. So, for instance, the list of the
ﬁrst three numbers can be written as 1 :: (2 :: (3 :: nil)). We usually omit the
parentheses, whereit is understoodthat ”::” associates to theright. Notethat every
list ends in nil.
In the lambda calculus, we can deﬁne nil = xy:y and H :: T = xy:xHT.
Here is a lambda term that adds a list of numbers:
addlist l = l(ht:add h(addlist t))(0):
Of course, this is a recursive deﬁnition, and must be translated into an actual
lambda term by the method of Section 3.3. In the deﬁnition of addlist, l and t are
lists of numbers, and h is a number. If you are very diligent, you can calculate the
sum of last weekend’s Canadian lottery results by evaluating the term
addlist(4 :: 22 :: 24 :: 32 :: 42 :: 43 :: nil):
Note that lists enable us to give am alternative encoding of the natural numbers:
We can encode a natural number as a list of booleans, which we interpret as the
binary digits 0 and 1. Of course, with this encoding, we would have to care-
fully redesign our basic functions, such as successor, addition, and multiplication.
However, if done properly, such an encoding would be a lot more efﬁcient (in
terms of number of -reductions to be performed) than the encoding by Church
numerals.
Trees. A binary tree is a data structure which can be one of two things: either a
leaf, labeled by a natural number, or a node, which has a left and a right subtree.
We write leaf(N) for a leaf labeled N, and node(L;R) for a node with left
subtree L and right subtree R. We can encode trees as lambda terms, for instance
as follows:
leaf(n) = xy:xn; node(L;R) = xy:yLR
21As an illustration, here is a program (i.e., a lambda term) which adds all the num-
bers at the leafs of a given tree.
addtree t = t(n:n)(lr:add(addtree l)(addtree r)):
Exercise 3.8. This is a voluntary programming exercise.
(a) Write a lambda term which calculates the length of a list.
(b) Write a lambda term which calculates the depth (i.e., the nesting level) of a
tree. Youmayneedtodeﬁneafunctionmax whichcalculatesthemaximum
of two numbers.
(c) Write a lambda term which sorts a list of numbers. You may assume given
a term less which compares two numbers.
224 The Church-Rosser Theorem
4.1 Extensionality, -equivalence, and -reduction
In the untyped lambda calculus, any term can be applied to another term. There-
fore, any term can be regarded as a function. Consider a term M, not containing
the variable x, and consider the term M 0 = x:Mx. Then for any argument A,
we have MA = M0A. So in this sense, M and M 0 deﬁne “the same function”.
Should M and M 0 be considered equivalent as terms?
Theanswerdepends onwhetherwe wanttoaccepttheprinciplethat“if M andM 0
deﬁne the same function, then M and M 0 are equal”. This is called the principle
of extensionality, and we have already encountered it in Section 1.1. Formally, the
extensionality rule is the following:
(ext8) 8A:MA = M0A
M = M0 :
In the presence ofthe axioms (), (cong), and(), it can be easily seen that MA =
M0A is true for all terms A if and only if Mx = M 0x, where x is a fresh variable.
Therefore, we can replace the extensionality rule by the following equivalent, but
simpler rule:
(ext) Mx = M0x; where x 62 FV (M;M0)
M = M0 :
NotethatwecanapplytheextensionalityruleinparticulartothecasewhereM 0 =
x:Mx, where x is not free in M. As we have remarked above, Mx = M0x,
and thus extensionality implies that M = x:Mx. This last equation is called the
-law (eta-law):
() M = x:Mx; where x 62 FV (M):
In fact, () and (ext) are equivalent in the presence of the other axioms of the
lambda calculus. We have already seen that (ext) and () imply (). Conversely,
assume (), and assume that Mx = M 0x, for some terms M and M 0 not con-
taining x freely. Then by (), we have x:Mx = x:M 0x, hence by () and
transitivity, M = M 0. Thus (ext) holds.
We note that the -law does not follow from the axioms and rules of the lambda
calculus that we have considered so far. In particular, the terms x and y:xy
23are not -equivalent, although they are clearly -equivalent. We will prove that
x 6= y:xy in Corollary 4.5 below.
Single-step -reduction is the smallest relation ! satisfying (cong1), (cong2),
(), and the following axiom (which is the same as the -law, directed left to
right):
() M ! x:Mx; where x 62 FV (M):
Single-step -reduction ! is deﬁned as the union of the single-step - and
-reductions, i.e., M ! M0 iff M ! M0 or M ! M0. Multi-step -
reduction ! !, multi-step -reduction ! !, as well as -equivalence = and
-equivalence = are deﬁned in the obvious way as we did for -reduction and
equivalence. We also get the evident notions of -normal form, -normal form,
etc.
4.2 Statement of the Church-Rosser Theorem, and some con-
sequences
Theorem (Church and Rosser, 1936). Let ! ! denote either ! ! or ! !. Sup-
pose M, N, and P are lambda terms such that M ! ! N and M ! ! P. Then
there exists a lambda term Z such that N ! ! Z and P ! ! Z.
In pictures, the theorem states that the following diagram can always be com-
pleted:
M
 ? ? ? ? ?

P

N

Z
This property is called the Church-Rosser property, or conﬂuence. Before we
prove the Church-Rosser Theorem, let us highlight some of its consequences.
Corollary 4.1. If M = N then there exists some Z with M;N ! ! Z. Similarly
for .
Proof. Please refer to Figure 1 for an illustration of this proof. Recall that = is
the reﬂexive symmetric transitive closure of !. Suppose that M = N. Then
there exist n > 0 and terms M0;:::;Mn such that M = M0, N = Mn, and
24M5
 ? ? ? ? ?

M6
 ? ? ? ? ?

M7

M3
 ? ? ? ? ?

M4

M2

M0
 ? ? ? ? ?
M1

Z00

Z0

Z
Figure 1: The proof of Corollary 4.1
for all i = 1:::n, either Mi 1 ! Mi or Mi ! Mi 1. We prove the claim
by induction on n. For n = 0, we have M = N and there is nothing to show.
Suppose the claim has been proven for n 1. Then by induction hypothesis, there
exists a term Z0 such that M ! ! Z0 and Mn 1 ! ! Z0. Further, we know that
either N ! Mn 1 or Mn 1 ! N. In case N ! Mn 1, then N ! ! Z0,
and we are done. In case Mn 1 ! N, we apply the Church-Rosser Theorem
to Mn 1, Z0, and N to obtain a term Z such that Z 0 ! ! Z and N ! ! Z.
Since M ! ! Z0 ! ! Z, we are done. The proof in the case of -reduction is
identical. 
Corollary 4.2. If N is a -normal form and N = M, then M ! ! N, and
similarly for .
Proof. By Corollary 4.1, there exists some Z with M;N ! ! Z. But N is a
normal form, thus N = Z. 
Corollary 4.3. If M and N are -normal forms such that M = N, then M =
N, and similarly for .
Proof. By Corollary 4.2, we have M ! ! N, but since M is a normal form, we
have M = N. 
25Corollary 4.4. If M = N, then neither or both havea -normal form. Similarly
for .
Proof. Suppose that M = N, and that one of them has a -normal form. Say,
for instance, that M has a normal form Z. Then N = Z, hence N ! ! Z by
Corollary 4.2. 
Corollary 4.5. The terms x and y:xy are not -equivalent. In particular, the
-rule does not follow from the -rule.
Proof. The terms x and y:xy are both -normal forms, and they are not -
equivalent. It follows by Corollary 4.3 that x 6= y:xy. 
4.3 Preliminary remarks on the proof of the Church-Rosser
Theorem
Consider any binary relation ! on a set, and let ! ! be its reﬂexitive transitive
closure. Consider the following three properties of such relations:
(a) M
 ? ? ? ? ?

P

N

Z
(b) M
 ? ? ? ? ?

P

N

Z
(c) M
 ? ? ? ? ?

P

N

Z
Each of these properties states that for all M;N;P, if the solid arrows exist, then
there exists Z such that the dotted arrows exist. The only difference between (a),
(b), and (c) is the difference between where ! and ! ! are used.
Property (a) is the Church-Rosser property. Property (c) is called the diamond
property (because the diagram is shaped like a diamond).
A naive attempt to prove the Church-Rosser Theorem might proceed as follows:
First, prove that the relation ! satisﬁes property (b) (this is relatively easy to
prove); then use an inductive argument to conclude that it also satisﬁes property
(a).
Unfortunately, this does not work: the reason is that in general, property (b) does
not imply property (a)! An example of a relation which satisﬁes property (b) but
26
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Figure 2: An example of a relation that satisﬁes property (b), but not property (a)
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Figure 3: Proof that property (c) implies property (a)
27not property (a) is shown in Figure 2. In other words, a proof of property (b) is
not sufﬁcient in order to prove property (a).
On the other hand, property (c), the diamond property, does imply property (a).
This is veryeasyto prove byinduction, andthe proof is illustrated inFigure3. But
unfortunately, -reduction does not satisfy property (c), so again we are stuck.
To summarize, we are faced with the following dilemma:
 -reduction satisﬁes property (b), but property (b) does not imply property
(a).
 Property (c) implies property (a), but -reduction does not satisfy property
(c).
On the other hand, it seems hopeless to prove property (a) directly. In the next
section, we will solve this dilemma by deﬁning yet another reduction relation .,
with the following properties:
 . satisﬁes property (c), and
 the transitive closure of . is the same as that of ! (or !).
4.4 Proof of the Church-Rosser Theorem
In this section, we will prove the Church-Rosser Theorem for -reduction. The
proof for -reduction (without ) is very similar, and in fact slighly simpler, so we
omit it here. The proof presented here is due to Tait and Martin-L¨ of. We begin by
deﬁning a new relation M . M 0 on terms, called parallel one-step reduction. We
deﬁne . to be the smallest relation satisfying
(1)
x . x
(2) P . P 0 N . N0
PN . P 0N0
(3) N . N0
x:N . x:N0
(4) Q . Q0 N . N0
(x:Q)N . Q0[N0=x]
(5) P . P 0; where x 62 FV (P)
x:Px . P0 :
28Lemma 4.6. (a) For all M;M 0, if M ! M0 then M . M0.
(b) For all M;M 0, if M . M0 then M ! ! M0.
(c) ! ! is the reﬂexive, transitive closure of ..
Proof. (a) First note that we have P . P, for any term P. This is easily shown by
induction on P. We now prove the claim by induction on a derivation of M ! 
M0. Please refer to pages 14 and 24 for the rules that deﬁne !. We make a
case distinction based on the last rule used in the derivation of M ! M0.
 If the last rule was (), then M = (x:Q)N and M 0 = Q[N=x], for some
Q and N. But then M . M 0 by (4), using the facts Q . Q and N . N.
 If the last rule was (), then M = x:Px and M 0 = P, for some P such
that x 62 FV (P). Then M . M0 follows from (5), using P . P.
 If the last rule was (cong1), then M = PN and M 0 = P 0N, for some P,
P 0, and N where P ! P 0. By induction hypothesis, P . P 0. From this
and N . N, it follows immediately that M . M 0 by (2).
 If the last rule was (cong2), we proceed similarly to the last case.
 If the last rule was (), then M = x:N and M 0 = x:N0 for some N and
N0 such that N ! N0. By induction hypothesis, N . N 0, which implies
M . M0 by (3).
(b) We prove this by induction on a derivation of M . M 0. We distinguish several
cases, depending on the last rule used in the derivation.
 If the last rule was (1), then M = M 0 = x, and we are done because
x ! ! x.
 If the last rule was (2), then M = PN and M 0 = P 0N0, for some P, P 0,
N, N0 with P . P 0 and N . N0. By induction hypothesis, P ! ! P 0 and
N ! ! N0. Since ! ! satisﬁes (cong), it follows that PN ! ! P 0N0,
hence M ! ! M0 as desired.
 If the last rule was (3), then M = x:N and M 0 = x:N0, for some N;N 0
with N . N0. By induction hypothesis, N ! ! N0, hence M = x:N !
! x:N0 = M0 by ().
29 If the last rule was (4), then M = (x:Q)N and M 0 = Q0[N0=x], for some
Q;Q0;N;N0 with Q . Q0 and N . N0. By induction hypothesis, Q ! !
Q0 and N ! ! N0. Therefore M = (x:Q)N ! ! (x:Q0)N0 !
Q0[N0=x] = M0, as desired.
 If the last rule was (5), then M = x:Px and M 0 = P 0, for some P;P 0
with P . P 0, and x 62 FV (P). By induction hypothesis, P ! ! P 0, hence
M = x:Px ! P ! ! P 0 = M0, as desired.
(c) This follows directly from (a) and (b). Let us write R for the reﬂexive transi-
tive closure of a relation R. By (a), we have !  ., hence ! ! = !
 
.. By (b), we have .  ! !, hence .  ! !
 = ! !. It follows that
. = ! !. 
We will soon prove that . satisﬁes the diamond property. Note that together with
Lemma 4.6(c), this will immediately imply that ! ! satisﬁes the Church-Rosser
property.
Lemma 4.7 (Substitution). If M . M 0 and U . U 0, then M[U=y] . M 0[U0=y].
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that any bound variables of M are
different from y and from the free variables of U. The claim is now proved by
induction on derivations of M . M 0. We distinguish several cases, depending on
the last rule used in the derivation:
 If the last rule was (1), then M = M 0 = x, for some variable x. If x = y,
then M[U=y] = U . U 0 = M0[U0=y]. If x 6= y, then by (1), M[U=y] =
y . y = M0[U0=y].
 Ifthe last rule was (2), thenM = PN andM 0 = P 0N0, forsome P, P 0, N,
N0 with P . P 0 and N . N0. By induction hypothesis, P[U=y] . P 0[U0=y]
and N[U=y] . N 0[U0=y], hence by (2), M[U=y] = P[U=y]N[U=y] .
P 0[U0=y]N0[U0=y] = M0[U0=y].
 If the last rule was (3), then M = x:N and M 0 = x:N0, for some N;N 0
with N . N0. By induction hypothesis, N[U=y] . N 0[U0=y], hence by (3)
M[U=y] = x:N[U=y] . x:N 0[U0=y] = M0[U0=y].
 If the last rule was (4), then M = (x:Q)N and M 0 = Q0[N0=x], for some
Q;Q0;N;N0 with Q . Q0 and N . N0. By induction hypothesis, Q[U=y] .
Q0[U0=y] and N[U=y] . N 0[U0=y], hence by (4), (x:Q[U=y])N[U=y] .
Q0[U0=y][N0[U0=y]=x] = Q0[N0=x][U0=y]. Thus M[U=y] = M 0[U0=y].
30 Ifthelast rulewas (5),thenM = x:Px andM 0 = P 0, forsomeP;P 0 with
P . P 0, and x 62 FV (P). By induction hypothesis, P[U=y] . P 0[U=y],
hence by (5), M[U=y] = x:P[U=y]x . P 0[U0=y] = M0[U0=y]. 
A more conceptual way of looking at this proof is the following: consider any
derivation of M . M 0 from axioms (1)–(5). In this derivation, replace any axiom
y . y by U . U 0, and propagate the changes (i.e., replace y by U on the left-
hand-side, and by U 0 on the right-hand-side of any .). The result is a derivation
of M[U=y] . M 0[U0=y]. (The formal proof that the result of this replacement
is indeed a valid derivation requires an induction, and this is the reason why the
proof of the substitution lemma is so long).
Ournext goalis toprovethat.satisﬁes thediamondproperty. Beforeprovingthis,
we ﬁrst deﬁne the maximal parallel one-step reduct M  of a term M as follows:
1. x = x, for a variable.
2. (PN) = P N, if PN is not a -redex.
3. ((x:Q)N) = Q[N=x].
4. (x:N) = x:N, if x:N is not an -redex.
5. (x:Px) = P , if x 62 FV (P).
Note that M depends only on M. The following lemma implies the diamond
property for ..
Lemma 4.8 (Maximal parallel one-step reductions). Whenever M . M 0, then
M0 . M.
Proof. By induction on the size of M. We distinguish ﬁve cases, depending on
the last rule used in the derivation of M . M 0. As usual, we assume that all bound
variables have been renamed to avoid clashes.
 If the last rule was (1), then M = M 0 = x, also M = x, and we are done.
 If the last rule was (2), then M = PN and M 0 = P 0N0, where P . P 0 and
N . N0. By induction hypothesis P 0 . P  and N0 . N. Two cases:
– If PN is not a -redex, then M  = P N. Thus M0 = P 0N0 .
P N = M by (2), and we are done.
31– If PN is a -redex, say P = x:Q, then M  = Q[N=x]. We dis-
tinguishtwosubcases, dependingonthelastruleusedinthederivation
of P . P 0:
 If the last rule was (3), then P 0 = x:Q0, where Q . Q0. By
induction hypothesis Q0 . Q, and with N0 . N, it follows that
M0 = (x:Q0)N0 . Q[N=x] = M by (4).
 If the last rule was (5), then P = x:Rx and P 0 = R0, where
x 62 FV (R) and R . R0. Consider the term Q = Rx. Since
Rx . R0x, and Rx is a subterm of M, by induction hypothe-
sis R0x . (Rx). By the substitution lemma, M 0 = R0N0 =
(R0x)[N0=x] . (Rx)[N=x] = M.
 If the last rule was (3), then M = x:N and M 0 = x:N0, where N . N0.
Two cases:
– If M is not an -redex, then M  = x:N. By induction hypothesis,
N0 . N, hence M0 . M by (3).
– If M is an -redex, then N = Px, where x 62 FV (P). In this case,
M = P . We distinguish two subcases, depending on the last rule
used in the derivation of N . N 0:
 If the last rule was (2), then N 0 = P 0x, where P . P 0. By
induction hypothesis P 0 . P . Hence M0 = x:P0x . P  =
M by (5).
 If the last rule was (4), then P = y:Q and N 0 = Q0[x=y], where
Q . Q0. Then M0 = x:Q0[x=y] = y:Q0 (note x 62 FV (Q0)).
But P . y:Q0, hence by induction hypothesis, y:Q0 . P  =
M.
 If the last rule was (4), then M = (x:Q)N and M 0 = Q0[N0=x], where
Q . Q0 and N . N0. Then M = Q[N=x], and M0 . M by the
substitution lemma.
 If the last rule was (5), then M = x:Px and M 0 = P 0, where P . P 0 and
x 62 FV (P). Then M = P . By induction hypothesis, P 0 . P , hence
M0 . M. 
The previous lemma immediately implies the diamond property for .:
Lemma 4.9 (Diamond property for .). If M . N and M . P, then there exists
Z such that N . Z and P . Z.
32Proof. Take Z = M . 
Finally, we have a proof of the Church-Rosser Theorem:
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Since . satisﬁes the diamond property, it follows that
its reﬂexive transitive closure . also satisﬁes the diamond property, as shown in
Figure 3. But . is the same as ! ! by Lemma 4.6(c), and the diamond property
for ! ! is just the Church-Rosser property for !. 
4.5 Exercises
Exercise 4.1. Give a detailed proof that property (c) from Section 4.3 implies
property (a).
Exercise 4.2. Prove that M . M, for all terms M.
Exercise 4.3. Without using Lemma 4.8, prove that M . M  for all terms M.
Exercise 4.4. Let 
 = (x:xx)(x:xx). Prove that 
 6= 

.
Exercise 4.5. What changes have to be made to Section 4.4 to get a proof of the
Church-Rosser Theorem for !, instead of !?
Exercise 4.6. Recall the properties (a)–(c) of binary relations ! that were dis-
cussed in Section 4.3. Consider the following similar property, which is some-
times called the “strip property”:
(d) M
 ? ? ? ? ?

P

N

Z:
Does (d) imply (a)? Does (b) imply (d)? In each case, give either a proof or a
counterexample.
Exercise 4.7. To every lambda term M, we may associate a directed graph (with
possibly multiple edges and loops) G(M) as follows: (i) the vertices are terms
N such that M ! ! N, i.e., all the terms that M can -reduce to; (ii) the edges
are given by a single-step -reduction. Note that the same term may have two (or
33more) reductions coming from different redexes; each such reduction is a separate
edge. For example, let I = x:x. Let M = I(Ix). Then
G(M) = I(Ix)
**
44 Ix // x :
Note that there are two separate edges from I(Ix) to Ix. We also sometimes
write bullets instead of terms, to get  ((
66  //  . As another example, let

 = (x:xx)(x:xx). Then
G(
) =  dd :
(a) Let M = (x:I(xx))(x:xx). Find G(M).
(b) Foreach ofthe following graphs, ﬁnd a term M suchthat G(M) is the given
graph, or explain why no such term exists. (Note: the “starting” vertexneed
not always be the leftmost vertex in the picture). Warning: some of these
terms are tricky to ﬁnd!
(i)
 //  dd
(ii)
  dd oo
(iii)
  // oo 
(iv)
  oo ((  hh
(v)
 ::  (( oo  // hh  dd
(vi)
 // 


[[666666
(vii)
 :: //  dd

ZZ
[[666666
345 The simply-typed lambda calculus
In the untyped lambda calculus, we were speaking about functions without speak-
ing about their domains and codomains. The domain and codomain of any func-
tion was the set of all lambda terms. We now introduce types into the lambda
calculus, and thus a notion of domain and codomain for functions. The difference
between types and sets is that types are syntactic objects, i.e., we can speak of
types without having to speak of their elements. We can think of types as names
for sets.
5.1 Simple types and simply-typed terms
We assumea set ofbasic types. We usuallyusethe Greekletter (“iota”) to denote
a basic type. The set of simple types is given by the following BNF:
Simple types: A;B ::=  A ! B A  B 1
The intended meaning of these types is as follows: base types are things like the
set of integers or the set of booleans. The type A ! B is the type of functions
from A to B. The type A  B is the type of pairs hx;yi, where x has type A and
y has type B. The type 1 is a one-element type. You can think of 1 as an abridged
version of the booleans, in which there is only one boolean instead of two. Or you
can think of 1 as the “void” or “unit” type in many programming languages: the
result type of a function which has no real result.
When we write types, we adopt the convention that  binds stronger than !, and
! associates to the right. Thus, AB ! C is (AB) ! C, and A ! B ! C
is A ! (B ! C).
The set of raw typed lambda terms is given by the following BNF:
Raw terms: M;N ::= x MN xA:M hM;Ni 1M 2M 
Unlike what we did in the untyped lambda calculus, we have added special syntax
here for pairs. Speciﬁcally, hM;Ni is a pair of terms, iM is a projection, with
the intention that ihM1;M2i = Mi. Also, we have added a term , which is the
unique element of the type 1. One other change from the untyped lambda calculus
is that we now write xA:M for a lambda abstraction to indicate that x has type
A. However, we will sometimes omit the superscripts and write x:M as before.
The notions of free and bound variables and -conversion are deﬁned as for the
untyped lambda calculus; again we identify -equivalent terms.
35(var)
 ;x:A ` x : A
(app)   ` M : A ! B   ` N : A
  ` MN : B
(abs)  ;x:A ` M : B
  ` xA:M : A ! B
(pair)   ` M : A   ` N : B
  ` hM;Ni : A  B
(1)   ` M : A  B
  ` 1M : A
(2)   ` M : A  B
  ` 2M : B
()
  `  : 1
Table 2: Typing rules for the simply-typed lambda calculus
We call the above terms the raw terms, because we have not yet imposed any
typing discipline on these terms. To avoid meaningless terms such as hM;Ni(P)
or 1(x:M), we introduce typing rules.
We use the colon notation M : A to mean “M is of type A”. (Similar to the
element notation in set theory). The typing rules are expressed in terms of typing
judgments. A typing judgment is an expression of the form
x1:A1;x2:A2;:::;xn:An ` M : A:
Its meaning is: “under the assumption that xi is of type Ai, for i = 1:::n,
the term M is a well-typed term of type A.” The free variables of M must be
contained in x1;:::;xn. The idea is that in order to determine the type of M, we
must make some assumptions about the type of its free variables. For instance, the
term xy will have type B if x:A ! B and y:A. Clearly, the type of xy depends
on the type of its free variables.
A sequenceof assumptions ofthe formx1:A1;:::;xn:An, as in the left-hand-side
ofatypingjudgment,is calledatypingcontext. We alwaysassumethatnovariable
appears more than once in a typing context, and we allow typing contexts to be re-
ordered implicitly. We often use the Greek letter   to stand for an arbitrary typing
context, and we use the notations  ; 0 and  ;x:A to denote the concatenation of
typing contexts, where it is always assumed that the sets of variables are disjoint.
The symbol `, which appears in a typing judgment, is called the turnstile symbol.
Its purpose is to separate the left-hand side from the right-hand side.
The typing rules for the simply-typed lambda calculus are shown in Table 2. The
rule (var) is a tautology: under the assumption that x has type A, x has type A.
The rule (app) states that a function of type A ! B can be applied to an argument
36of type A to produce a result of type B. The rule (abs) states that if M is a term of
typeB with a free variable x oftype B, thenxA:M is a functionoftype A ! B.
The other rules have similar interpretations.
Here is an example of a valid typing derivation:
x:A ! A;y:A ` x : A ! A
x:A ! A;y:A ` x : A ! A x:A ! A;y:A ` y : A
x:A ! A;y:A ` xy : A
x:A ! A;y:A ` x(xy) : A
x:A ! A ` yA:x(xy) : A ! A
` xA!A:yA:x(xy) : (A ! A) ! A ! A
One important property of these typing rules is that there is precisely one rule
for each kind of lambda term. Thus, when we construct typing derivations in a
bottom-up fashion, there is always a unique choice of which rule to apply next.
The only real choice we have is about which types to assign to variables.
Exercise 5.1. Give a typing derivation of each of the following typing judgments:
(a) ` x(A!A)!B:x(yA:y) : ((A ! A) ! B) ! B
(b) ` xAB:h2x;1xi : (A  B) ! (B  A)
Not all terms are typeable. For instance, the terms 1(x:M) and hM;Ni(P)
cannot be assigned a type, and neither can the term x:xx. Here, by “assigning
a type” we mean, assigning types to the free and bound variables such that the
corresponding typing judgment is derivable. We say that a term is typeable if it
can be assigned a type.
Exercise 5.2. Show that neither of the three terms mentioned in the previous
paragraph is typeable.
Exercise 5.3. We said that we will identify -equivalent terms. Show that this
is actually necessary. In particular, show that if we didn’t identify -equivalent
terms, there would be no valid derivation of the typing judgment
` xA:xB:x : A ! B ! B:
Give a derivation of this typing judgment using the bound variable convention.
375.2 Connections to propositional logic
Consider the following types:
(1) (A  B) ! A
(2) A ! B ! (A  B)
(3) (A ! B) ! (B ! C) ! (A ! C)
(4) A ! A ! A
(5) ((A ! A) ! B) ! B
(6) A ! (A  B)
(7) (A ! C) ! C
Let us ask, in each case, whether it is possible to ﬁnd a closed term of the given
type. We ﬁnd the following terms:
(1) xAB:1x
(2) xA:yB:hx;yi
(3) xA!B:yB!C:zA:y(xz)
(4) xA:yA:x and xA:yA:y
(5) x(A!A)!B:x(yA:y)
(6) can’t ﬁnd a closed term
(7) can’t ﬁnd a closed term
Can we answer the general question, given a type, whether there exists a closed
term for it?
For a new way to look at the problem, take the types (1)–(7) and make the follow-
ing replacement of symbols: replace “!” by “)” and replace “” by “^”. We
obtain the following formulas:
(1) (A ^ B) ) A
(2) A ) B ) (A ^ B)
(3) (A ) B) ) (B ) C) ) (A ) C)
(4) A ) A ) A
(5) ((A ) A) ) B) ) B
(6) A ) (A ^ B)
(7) (A ) C) ) C
Note that these are formulas of propositional logic, where “)” is implication, and
“^” is conjunction(“and”). What canwe say about the validityof these formulas?
It turns out that (1)–(5) are tautologies, whereas (6)–(7) are not. Thus, the types
38that we could ﬁnd a lambda term for turn out to be the ones that are valid when
considered as formulas in propositional logic! This is not entirely coincidental.
Let us consider, for example, how to prove (A^B) ) A. The proofis veryshort,
it goes as follows: “Assume A ^ B. Then, by the ﬁrst part of that assumption,
A holds. Thus (A ^ B) ) A.” On the other hand, the lambda term of the
corresponding type is xAB:1x. You can see that there is a close connection
between the proof and the lambda term. Namely, if one reads xAB as “assume
A ^ B (call the assumption ‘x’)”, and if one reads 1x as “by the ﬁrst part of
assumption x”, then this lambda term can be read as a proof of the proposition
(A ^ B) ) A.
This connection between simply-typed lambda calculus and propositional logic is
known as the “Curry-Howard isomorphism”. Since types of the lambda calculus
correspond to formulas in propositional logic, and terms correspond to proofs, the
concept is also known as the “proofs-as-programs” paradigm, or the “formulas-
as-types” correspondence. We will make the actual correspondence more precise
in the next two sections.
Before we go any further, we must make one important point. When we are
going to make precise the connection between simply-typed lambda calculus and
propositionallogic,wewillseethattheappropriatelogicis intuitionisticlogic,and
not the ordinary classical logic that we are used to from mathematical practice.
The main difference between intuitionistic and classical logic is that the former
misses the principles of “proof by contradiction” and “excluded middle”. The
principle of proof by contradiction states that if the assumption “not A” leads to
a contradiction then we have proved A. The principle of excluded middle states
that either “A” or “not A” must be true.
Intuitionistic logic is also known as constructive logic, because all proofs in it
are by construction. Thus, in intuitionistic logic, the only way to prove the ex-
istence of some object is by actually constructing the object. This is in contrast
with classical logic, where we may prove the existence of an object simply by
deriving a contradiction from the assumption that the object doesn’t exist. The
disadvantage of constructive logic is that it is generally more difﬁcult to prove
things. The advantage is that once one has a proof, the proof can be transformed
into an algorithm.
395.3 Propositional intuitionistic logic
We start by introducinga system forintuitionisticlogic whichuses onlythreecon-
nectives: “^”, “!”, and “>”. Formulas A;B ::: are built from atomic formulas
;;::: via the BNF
Formulas: A;B ::=  A ! B A ^ B >:
We now need to formalize proofs. The formalized proofs will be called “deriva-
tions”. The system we introduce here is known as natural deduction.
In natural deduction, derivations are certain kinds of trees. In general, we will be
dealingwithderivationsofaformulaAfromasetofassumptions  = fA1;:::;Ang.
Such a derivation will be written schematically as
x1:A1;:::;xn:An
. . .
A :
We simplify the bookkeeping by giving a name to each assumption, and we will
use lower-case letters such as x;y;z for such names. In using the above notation
for schematically writing a derivation of A from assumptions  , it is understood
that the derivation may in fact use a given assumption more than once, or zero
times. The rules for constructing derivations are as follows:
1. (Axiom)
(ax) x : A
A
x
is a derivation of A from assumption A (and possibly other assumptions
which were used zero times). We have written the letter “x” next to the
rule, to indicate precisely which assumption we have used here.
2. (^-introduction) If
 
. . .
A and
 
. . .
B
40are derivations of A and B, respectively, then
(^-I)
 
. . .
A
 
. . .
B
A ^ B
is a derivation of A ^ B. In other words, a proof of A ^ B is a proof of A
and a proof of B.
3. (^-elimination) If
 
. . .
A ^ B
is a derivation of A ^ B, then
(^-E1)
 
. . .
A ^ B
A
and (^-E2)
 
. . .
A ^ B
B
are derivations of A and B, respectively. In other words, from A ^ B, we
are allowed to conclude both A and B.
4. (>-introduction) If
(>-I)
>
is a derivation of > (possibly from some assumptions, which were not
used). In other words, > is always true.
5. (!-introduction) If
 ;x:A
. . .
B
is a derivation of B from assumptions   and A, then
(!-I)
 ;[x:A]
. . .
B
A ! B
x
41is a derivation of A ! B from   alone. Here, the assumption x:A is no
longer an assumption of the new derivation — we say that it has been “can-
celed”. We indicate canceled assumptions by enclosing them in brackets [],
and we indicate the place where the assumption was canceled by writing
the letter x next to the rule where it was canceled.
6. (!-elimination) If
 
. . .
A ! B and
 
. . .
A
are derivations of A ! B and A, respectively, then
(!-E)
 
. . .
A ! B
 
. . .
A
B
is a derivation of B. In other words, from A ! B and A, we are allowed
to conclude B. This rule is sometimes called by its Latin name, “modus
ponens”.
This ﬁnishes the deﬁnition of derivations in natural deduction. Note that, with the
exception of the axiom, each rule belongs to some speciﬁc logical connective, and
there are introduction and elimination rules. “^” and “!” have both introduction
and elimination rules, whereas “>” only has an introduction rule.
In natural deduction, like in real mathematical life, assumptions can be made at
any time. The challenge is to get rid of assumptions once they are made. In the
end, we would like to have a derivation of a given formula which depends on as
few assumptions as possible — in fact, we don’t regard the formula as proven
unless we can derive it from no assumptions. The rule (!-I) allows us to discard
temporary assumptions which we might have made during the proof.
Exercise 5.4. Give a derivation, in natural deduction, for each of the formulas
(1)–(5) from Section 5.2.
5.4 The Curry-Howard Isomorphism
Thereis anobvious one-to-onecorrespondencebetweentypesofthe simply-typed
lambda calculus and the formulas of propositional intuitionistic logic introduced
42in the previous section (provided that the set of basic types can be identiﬁed with
the set of atomic formulas). We will identify formulas and types from now on,
where it is convenient to do so.
Perhaps less obvious is the fact that derivations are in one-to-one correspondence
with simply-typed lambda terms. To be precisely, we will give a translation from
derivations to lambda terms, and a translation from lambda terms to derivations,
which are mutually inverse up to -equivalence.
To a derivation
x1:A1;:::;xn:An
. . .
A ;
we will associate a lambda term M such that x1:A1;:::;xn:An ` M : A is a
valid typing judgment. We deﬁne M by recursion on the deﬁnition of derivations.
We prove simultaneously,byinduction, thatx1:A1;:::;xn:An ` M : A is indeed
a valid typing judgment.
If the derivation is
(ax) x:A
A
x;
then the lambda term is M = x. Clearly, x:A ` x : A is a valid typing judgment
by (var).
If the derivation is
(^-I)
 
. . .
A
 
. . .
B
A ^ B
;
then the lambda term is M = hP;Qi, where P and Q are the terms associated
to the two respective subderivations. By induction hypothesis,   ` P : A and
  ` Q : B, thus   ` hP;Qi : A  B by (pair).
If the derivation is
(^-E1)
 
. . .
A ^ B
A
;
then we let M = 1P, where P is the term associated to the subderivation. By
induction hypothesis,   ` P : A  B, thus   ` 1P : A by (1). The case of
43(^-E2) is entirely symmetric.
If the derivation is
(>-I)
>
;
then we let M = . We have `  : 1 by ().
If the derivation is
(!-I)
 ;[x:A]
. . .
B
A ! B
x;
then we let M = xA:P, where P is the term associated to the subderivation. By
induction hypothesis,  ;x:A ` P : B, hence   ` xA:P : A ! B by (abs).
Finally, if the derivation is
(!-E)
 
. . .
A ! B
 
. . .
A
B
;
then we let M = PQ, where P and Q are the terms associated to the two respec-
tive subderivations. By induction hypothesis,   ` P : A ! B and   ` Q : A,
thus   ` PQ : B by (app).
Conversely, given a well-typed lambda term M, with associated typing judgment
  ` M : A, then we can construct a derivation of A from assumptions  . We
deﬁne this derivation by recursion on the type derivation of   ` M : A. The
details are too tedious to spell them out here; we simply go though each of the
rules (var), (app), (abs), (pair), (1), (2), () and apply the corresponding rule
(ax), (!-I), (!-E), (^-I), (^-E1), (^-E2), (>-I), respectively.
5.5 Reductions in the simply-typed lambda calculus
- and -reductions in the simply-typed lambda calculus are deﬁned much in the
same way as for the untyped lambda calculus, except that we have introduced
some additional terms (such as pairs and projections), which calls for some addi-
44tional reduction rules. We deﬁne the following reductions:
(!) (xA:M)N ! M[N=x];
(!) xA:Mx ! M; where x 62 FV (M);
(;1) 1hM;Ni ! M;
(;2) 2hM;Ni ! N;
() h1M;2Mi ! M;
(1) M ! ; if M : 1:
Then single- and multi-step - and -reduction are deﬁned as the usual contextual
closure of the above rules, and the deﬁnitions of - and -equivalence also follow
the usual pattern. In addition to the usual (cong) and () rules, we now also have
congruence rules that apply to pairs and projections.
We remark that, to be perfectly precise, we should have deﬁned reductions be-
tween typing judgments, and not between terms. This is necessary because some
of the reduction rules, notably (1), depend on the type of the terms involved.
However, this would be notationally very cumbersome, and we will blur the dis-
tinction, pretending at times that terms appear in some implicit typing context
which we do not write.
An important property of the reduction is the “subject reduction” property, which
states that well-typed terms reduce only to well-typed terms of the same type.
This has an immediate application to programming: subject reduction guarantees
that if we write a program of type “integer”, then the ﬁnal result of evaluating the
program, if any, will indeed be an integer, and not, say, a boolean.
Theorem 5.1 (Subject Reduction). If   ` M : A and M ! M0, then   `
M0 : A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of M ! M0, and by case distinction on
the last rule used in the derivation of   ` M : A. For instance, if M ! M0 by
(!), then M = (xB:P)Q and M0 = P[Q=x]. If   ` M : A, then we must
have  ;x:B ` P : A and   ` Q : B. It follows that   ` P[Q=x] : A; the latter
statement can be proved separately (as a “substitution lemma”) by induction on P
and makes crucial use of the fact that x and Q have the same type.
The other cases are similar, and we leave them as an exercise. Note that, in par-
ticular, one needs to consider the (cong), (), and other congruence rules as well.

One important theorem that does not hold for -reduction in the simply-typed
!;;1-calculus is the Church-Rosser theorem. The culprit is the rule (1). For
45instance, if x is a variable of type A  1, then the term M = h1x;2xi reduces
to x by (), but also to h1x;i by (1). Both these terms are normal forms.
However, in the calculus without the type 1 and term , the Church-Rosser prop-
erty still holds. Also, for -reduction alone, without -reduction, the Church-
Rosser property holds.
5.6 Reduction as proof simpliﬁcation
Having made a one-to-one correspondence between simply-typed lambda terms
and derivations in intuitionistic natural deduction, we may now ask what - and
-reductions correspond to under this correspondence. It turns out that these re-
ductions can be thought of as “proof simpliﬁcation steps”.
Consider for example the -reduction 1hM;Ni ! M. If we translate the left-
hand side and the right-hand side via the Curry-Howard isomorphism, we get
(^-E1)
(^-I)
 
. . .
A
 
. . .
B
A ^ B
A
!
 
. . .
A :
We can see that the left derivation contains an introduction rule immediately fol-
lowed by an elimination rule. This leads to an obvious simpliﬁcationif we replace
the left derivation by the right one.
In general, -redexes correspond to situations where an introduction rule is im-
mediately followed by an elimination rule, and -redexes correspond to situations
where an elimination rule is immediately followed by an introduction rule. For
example, consider the -reduction h1M;2Mi ! M. This translates to:
(^-I)
(^-E1)
 
. . .
A ^ B
A
(^-E2)
 
. . .
A ^ B
B
A ^ B
!
 
. . .
A ^ B
Again, this is an obvious simpliﬁcation step, but it has a side condition: the left
and right subderivation must be the same! This side condition corresponds to the
46fact that in the redex h1M;2Mi, the two subterms called M must be equal. It
is another characteristic of -reductions that they often carry such side conditions.
The reduction M !  translates as follows:
 
. . .
> ! (>-I)
>
In other words, any derivation of > can be replaced by the canonical such deriva-
tion.
More interesting is the case of the (!) rule. Here, we have (xA:M)N !
M[N=x], which can be translated via the Curry-Howard Isomorphism as follows:
(!-E)
(!-I)
 ;[x:A]
. . .
B
A ! B
x
 
. . .
A
B
!
 ;
 
. . .
A
. . .
B :
What is going on here is that we have a derivation M of B from assumptions  
and A, and we have another derivation N of A from  . We can directly obtain a
derivation of B from   by stacking the second derivation on top of the ﬁrst!
Notice that this last proof “simpliﬁcation” step may not actually be a simpliﬁca-
tion. Namely, if the hypothesis labeled x is used many times in the derivation
M, then N will have to be copied many times in the right-hand side term. This
corresponds to the fact that if x occurs several times in M, then M[N=x] might
be a longer and more complicated term than (x:M)N.
Finally, consider the (!) rule xA:Mx ! M, where x 62 FV (M). This trans-
lates to derivations as follows:
(!-I)
(!-E)
 
. . .
A ! B (ax) [x:A]
A
x
B
A ! B
x !
 
. . .
A ! B
475.7 Getting mileage out of the Curry-Howard isomorphism
TheCurry-Howardisomorphismmakesaconnectionbetweenlogicandthelambda
calculus. We can think of it as a connection between “proofs” and “programs”.
What is such a connection good for? Like any isomorphism, it allows us to switch
back and forth and think in whichever system suits our intuition in a given situ-
ation. Moreover, we can save a lot of work by transferring theorems that were
proved about the lambda calculus to logic, and vice versa. As an example, we will
see how to add disjunctions to propositional intuitionistic logic in the next section,
and then we will explore what we can learn about the lambda calculus from that.
5.8 Disjunction and sum types
To the BNF for formulas of propositional intuitionistic logic from Section 5.3, we
add the following clauses:
Formulas: A;B ::= ::: A _ B ?:
Here, A _ B stands for disjunction, or “or”, and ? stands for falsity, which we
can also think of as zero-ary disjunction. The symbol ? is also known by the
names of “bottom”, “absurdity”, or “contradiction”. The rules for constructing
derivations are extended by the following cases:
7. (_-introduction) If
 
. . .
A
is a derivation of A, then
(_-I1)
 
. . .
A
A _ B
is a derivation of A _ B. Similarly, if
 
. . .
B
48is a derivation of B, then
(_-I2)
 
. . .
B
A _ B
is a derivation of A _ B. In other words, if we have proven A or we have
proven B, then we may conclude A _ B.
8. (_-elimination) If
 
. . .
A _ B and
 ;x:A
. . .
C and
 ;y:B
. . .
C
are derivations, then
(_-E)
 
. . .
A _ B
 ;[x:A]
. . .
C
 ;[y:B]
. . .
C
C
x;y
is a derivation. This is known as the “principle of case distinction”. If
we have proven A _ B, then we may proceed by cases. In the ﬁrst case,
we assume A holds. In the second case, we assume B holds. In either
case, we prove C, which therefore holds independently. The assumptions
A and B in the side derivations get canceled, and as usual, we mark the rule
which canceled the assumptions by writing the names x;y of the respective
variables next to it.
Note that the _-elimination rule differs from all other rules we have con-
sidered so far, because it involves some arbitrary formula C which is not
directly related to the principal formula A _ B being eliminated.
9. (?-elimination) If
 
. . .
?
49is a derivation of a contradiction, then
(?-E)
 
. . .
?
C
is a derivation of C, for an arbitrary formula C. This rule formalizes the
familiar principle “ex falsum quodlibet”, which means that false implies
anything.
There is no ?-introduction rule. This is symmetric to the fact that there is no
>-elimination rule.
Having extended our logic with disjunctions, we can now ask what these disjunc-
tions correspond to under the Curry-Howard isomorphism. Naturally, we need to
extend the lambda calculus by as many new terms as we have new rules in the
logic. It turns out that disjunctions correspond to a concept which is quite natural
in programming: sum or union types.
To the lambda calculus, add type constructors A + B and 0.
Simple types: A;B ::= ::: A + B 0:
Intuitively, A+B is the disjoint union of A and B, as in set theory: an element of
A + B is either an element of A or an element of B, together with an indication
of which one is the case. In particular, if we consider an element of A + A, we
can still tell whether it is in the left or right component, even though the two types
are the same. In programming languages, this is sometimes known as a “union”
or “variant” type. We call it a “sum” type here. The type 0 is simply the empty
type, corresponding to the empty set in set theory.
Whatshouldthelambdatermsbethatgowiththesenewtypes? We know fromour
experience with the Curry-Howard isomorphism that we have to have precisely
one term constructor for each introduction or elimination rule of natural deduc-
tion. Moreover, we know that if such a rule has n subderivations, then our term
constructor has to have n immediate subterms. We also know something about
bound variables: Each time a hypothesis gets canceled in a natural deduction rule,
there has a be a binder of the corresponding variable in the lambda calculus. From
this information, we can pretty much ﬁgure out what the lambda terms should be;
the only choice that is left to us is how to call them!
50(in1)   ` M : A
  ` in1M : A + B
(in2)   ` M : B
  ` in2M : A + B
(case)   ` M : A + B  ;x:A ` N : C  ;y:B ` P : C
  ` (caseM ofxA ) N jyB ) P) : C
()   ` M : 0
  ` AM : A
Table 3: Typing rules for sums
We add four terms to the lambda calculus:
Raw terms: M;N ::= ::: in1M in2M caseM ofxA ) N jyB ) P AM
The typing rules for these new terms are shown in Table 3. By comparing these
rules to (_-I1), (_-I2), (_-E), and (?-E), you can see that they are precisely
analogous.
But what is the meaning of these new terms? The term in1M is simply an element
of the left component of A + B. We can think of in1 as the injection function
A ! A + B. Similar for in2. The term caseM ofxA ) N jyB ) P is a case
distinction: evaluate M of type A + B. The answer is either in A or in B. In
the ﬁrst case, assign the answer to the variable x and evaluate N. In the second
case, assign the answer to the variable y and evaluate P. Since both N and P are
of type C, we get a ﬁnal result of type C. Note that the case statement is very
similar to an if-then-else; the only difference is that the two alternatives also carry
a value. Indeed, the booleans can be deﬁned as 1 + 1, in which case T = in 1,
F = in2, and if then else MNP = caseM ofx1 ) N jy1 ) P, where x and
y don’t occur in N and P, respectively.
Finally, the term AM is a simple type cast.
5.9 Classical logic vs. intuitionistic logic
We have mentioned before that the natural deduction calculus we have presented
corresponds to intuitionistic logic, and not classical logic. But what exactly is the
difference? Well, the difference is that in intuitionistic logic, we have no rule for
proof by contradiction, and we do not have A _ :A as an axiom.
51Let us adopt the following convention for negation: the formula :A (“not A”) is
regarded as an abbreviation for A ! ?. This way, we do not have to introduce
special formulas and rules for negation; we simply use the existing rules for !
and ?.
In intuitionistic logic, there is not derivation of A _ :A, for general A. Or
equivalently, in the simply-typed lambda calculus, there is no closed term of type
A + (A ! 0). We are not yet in a position to prove this formally, but informally,
the argument goes as follows: If the type A is empty, then there can be no closed
term of type A (otherwise A would have that term as an element). On the other
hand, if the type A is non-empty, then there can be no closed term of type A ! 0
(or otherwise, if we applied that term to some element of A, we would obtain an
element of 0). But if we were to write a generic term of type A + (A ! 0), then
this term would have to work no matter what A is. Thus, the term would have to
decide whether to use the left or right component independently of A. But for any
such term, we can get a contradiction by choosing A either empty or non-empty.
Closely related is the fact that in intuitionistic logic, we do not have a principle of
proof by contradiction. The “proof by contradiction” rule is the following: If
 ;x::A
. . .
?
is a derivation of a contradiction from :A, then
(contra)
 ;[x::A]
. . .
?
A
x
is a derivation of A. This is not a rule of intuitionistic propositional logic, but we
can explore what would happen if we were to add such a rule. First, we observe
that the contradiction rule is very similar to the following:
 ;[x:A]
. . .
?
:A
x:
However, since we deﬁned :A to be the same as A ! ?, the latter rule is an
52instance of (!-I). The contradiction rule, on the other hand, is not an instance of
(!-I).
If we admit the rule (contra), then A _ :A can be derived. The following is such
a derivation:
(!-E) [y::(A _ :A)]
(!-E)
[y::(A _ :A)] (_-I2) [x:A]
A _ :A
(_-I2)
(!-I) ?
:A
x
A _ :A
(contra) ?
A _ :A
y
Conversely, if we added A _ :A as an axiom to intuitionistic logic, then this
already implies the (contra) rule, in a suitable sense. Namely, from any derivation
of  ;x::A ` ?, we can obtain a derivation of   ` A by using A _ :A as an
axiom. Thus, we can simulate the (contra) rule, in the presence of A _ :A.
(_-E) A _ :A
(?-E)
 ;[x::A]
. . .
?
A
(ax) [y:A]
A
A
x;y
In this sense, we can say that the rule (contra) and the axiom A _ :A are equiva-
lent, in the presence of the other axioms and rules of intuitionistic logic.
It turns outthatthe systemof intuitionistic logicplus (contra) is equivalent toclas-
sical logic as we know it. It is in this sense that we can say that intuitionistic logic
is “classical logic without proofs by contradiction”. We summarize the results of
this section in terms of a slogan:
intuitionistic logic + (contra)
= intuitionistic logic + “A _ :A”
= classical logic.
Theproof theoryofintuitionisticlogicis averyinterestingsubjectin its ownright,
and an entire course could be taught just on that subject.
535.10 A word on Church-Rosser
After our brief forray into logic, let us now go back to the simply-typed lambda
calculus. Let us also forget about sum types, which present their own set of difﬁ-
culties, and let us concentrate on the !;;1-calculus instead.
IfweconsiderthereductionrulesdiscussedinSection5.5,wecanaskthequestion
whether these reductions satisfy the Church-Rosser property. Unfortunately, the
answer is negative, as the following example shows: Let x be a variable of type
A  1, and consider the term M = h1x;2xi. Then M reduces to x by (),
but M also reduces to h1x;i by (1). Neither of these terms contains a redex,
so there is no chance they could reduce any further. Thus, the Church-Rosser
property fails.
h1x;2xi

{{vvvvvvvvvv
1
&& L L L L L L L L L L
x h1x;i
There are several ways around this problem. For instance, if we omit all the -
reductions and consider only -reductions, then the Church-Rosser property does
hold. Eliminating -reductions does not have much of an effect on the lambda
calculus from a computational point of view; already in the untyped lambda cal-
culus, we noticed that all interesting calculations could in fact be carried out with
-reductions alone. We can say that -reductions are the engine for computation,
whereas -reductions only serve to clean up the result. In particular, it can never
happen that some -reduction inhibits another -reduction: if M !  M0, and if
M0 has a -redex, then it must be the case that M already has a corresponding
-redex. Also, -reductions always reduce the size of a term. It follows that if M
is a -normal form, then M can always be reduced to a -normal form in a ﬁnite
sequence of -reductions.
5.11 Exercises
Exercise 5.5. Prove the Church-Rosser theorem for -reductions in the  !;;1-
calculus. Hint: use the same method which we used in the untyped case.
Exercise 5.6. The formula ((A ! B) ! A) ! A is valid in classical logic, but
not in intuitionistic logic. Give a proof of this formula in natural deduction, using
the rule (contra).
546 Weak and strong normalization
6.1 Deﬁnitions
As we have seen, computing with lambda terms means reducing lambda terms to
normal form. By the Church-Rosser theorem, such a normal form is guaranteed
to be unique if it exists. But so far, we have paid little attention to the question
whether normal forms exist for a given term, and if so, how we need to reduce the
term to ﬁnd a normal form.
Deﬁnition. Given a notion of term and a reduction relation, we say that a term M
is weakly normalizing if there exists a ﬁnite sequence of reductions M ! M1 !
::: ! Mn such that Mn is a normal form. We say that M is strongly normalizing
if there does not exist an inﬁnite sequence of reductions starting from M, or in
other words, if every sequence of reductions starting from M is ﬁnite.
Recall the following consequence of the Church-Rosser theorem, which we stated
as Corollary 4.2: If M has a normal form N, then M ! ! N. It follows that a
term M is weakly normalizing if and only if it has a normal form. This does not
imply that every possible way of reducing M leads to a normal form. A term is
stronglynormalizing if and onlyif everyway of reducing it leads to a normal form
in ﬁnitely many steps.
Consider for example the following terms in the untyped lambda calculus:
1. The term 
 = (x:xx)(x:xx) is neither weakly nor strongly normalizing.
It does not have a normal form.
2. The term (x:y)
 is weakly normalizing, but not strongly normalizing. It
reduces to the normal form y, but it also has an inﬁnite reduction sequence.
3. The term (x:y)((x:x)(x:x)) is strongly normalizing. While there are
several different ways to reduce this term, they all lead to a normal form in
ﬁnitely many steps.
4. The term x:x is strongly normalizing, since it has no reductions, much
less an inﬁnite reduction sequence. More generally, every normal form is
strongly normalizing.
We see immediately that strongly normalizing implies weakly normalizing. How-
ever, as the above examples show, the converse is not true.
556.2 Weakandstrong normalizationinthe simply-typedlambda
calculus
We found that the term 
 = (x:xx)(x:xx) is not weakly or strongly normaliz-
ing. On the other hand, we also know that this term is not typeable in the simply-
typed lambda calculus. This is not a coincidence, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 6.1 (Weak normalization theorem). In the simply-typed lambda cal-
culus, all terms are weakly normalizing.
Theorem 6.2 (Strong normalization theorem). In the simply-typed lambda cal-
culus, all terms are strongly normalizing.
Clearly, the strong normalization theorem implies the weak normalization theo-
rem. However, the weak normalization theorem is much easier to prove, which
is the reason we proved both these theorems in class. In particular, the proof of
the weak normalization theorem gives an explicit measure of the complexity of
a term, in terms of the number of redexes of a certain degree in the term. There
is no corresponding complexity measure in the proof of the strong normalization
theorem.
Please refer to the relevant chapters of “Proof and Types”, by Girard, Lafont, and
Taylor, for the proofs of these theorems.
7 Type inference
In Section 5, we introduced the simply-typed lambda calculus, and we discussed
what it means for a term to be well-typed. We have also asked the question, for a
given term, whether it is typeable or not.
In this section, we will discuss an algorithm which decides, given a term, whether
it is typeable or not, and if the answer is yes, it also outputs a type for the term.
Such an algorithm is known as a type inference algorithm.
A weaker kind of algorithm is a type checking algorithm. A type checking algo-
rithm takes as its input a term with full type annotations, as well as the types of
any free variables, and it decides whether the term is well-typed or not. Thus, a
type checking algorithm does not infer any types; the type must be given to it as
an input and the algorithm merely checks whether the type is legal.
Many compilers of programming languages include a type checker, and programs
that are notwell-typedare typically refused. The compilers of some programming
56languages, such as ML or Haskell, go one step further and include a type infer-
ence algorithm. This allows programmers to write programs with no or very few
type annotations, and the compiler will ﬁgure out the types automatically. This
makes the programmer’s life much easier, especially in the case of higher-order
languages, where types such as ((A ! B) ! C) ! D are not uncommon and
would be very cumbersome to write down. However, in the event that type in-
ference fails, it is not always easy for the compiler to issue a meaningful error
message that can help the human programmer ﬁx the problem. Often, at least a
basic understanding of how the type inference algorithm works is necessary for
programmers to understand these error messages.
7.1 Principal types
A simply-typed lambda term can have more than one possible type. Suppose that
we have three basic types 1;2;3 in our type system. Then the following are all
valid typing judgments for the term x:y:yx:
` x1:y1!1:yx : 1 ! (1 ! 1) ! 1;
` x2!3:y(2!3)!3:yx : (2 ! 3) ! ((2 ! 3) ! 3) ! 3;
` x1:y1!3:yx : 1 ! (1 ! 3) ! 3;
` x1:y1!3!2:yx : 1 ! (1 ! 3 ! 2) ! 3 ! 2;
` x1:y1!1!1:yx : 1 ! (1 ! 1 ! 1) ! 1 ! 1:
What all these typing judgments have in common is that they are of the form
` xA:yA!B:yx : A ! (A ! B) ! B;
for certain types A and B. In fact, as we will see, every possible type of the term
x:y:yx is of this form. We also say that A ! (A ! B) ! B is the most
general type or the principal type of this term, where A and B are placeholders
for arbitrary types.
The existence of a most general type is not a peculiarity of the term xy:yx, but
it is true of the simply-typed lambda calculus in general: every typeable term has
a most general type. This statement is known as the principal type property.
We will see that our type inference algorithm not only calculates a possible type
for a term, but in fact it calculates the most general type, if any type exists at all.
In fact, we will prove the principal type property by closely examining the type
inference algorithm.
577.2 Type templates and type substitutions
Inorderto formalize the notionofa most general type, we needto beable to speak
of types with placeholders.
Deﬁnition. Suppose we are given an inﬁnite set of type variables, which we de-
note by upper case letters X;Y;Z etc. A type template is a simple type, built from
type variables and possibly basic types. Formally, type templates are given by the
BNF
Type templates: A;B ::= X  A ! B A  B 1
Note that we use the same letters A;B to denote type templates which we previ-
ously used to denote types. In fact, from now on, we will simply regard types as
special type templates which happen to contain no type variables.
The point of type variables is that theyare placeholders (just like any otherkind of
variables). This means, we can replace type variables by arbitrary types, or even
by type templates. A type substitution is just such a replacement.
Deﬁnition. A type substitution  is a function from type variables to type tem-
plates. We often write [X1 7! A1;:::;Xn 7! An] for the substitution deﬁned by
(Xi) = Ai for i = 1:::n, and (Y ) = Y if Y 62 fX1;:::;Xng. If  is a type
substitution, and A is a type template, then we deﬁne  A, the application of  to
A, as follows by induction on A:
 X = X;
  = ;
 (A ! B) =  A !  B;
 (A  B) =  A   B;
 1 = 1:
In words,  A is simply the same as A, except that all the type variables have been
replaced according to . We are now in a position to formalize what it means for
one type template to be more general than another.
Deﬁnition. Suppose A and B are type templates. We say that A is more general
than B if there exists a type substitution  such that  A = B.
In other words, we consider A to be more general than B if B can be obtained
from A by a substitution. We also say that B is an instance of A. Examples:
 X ! Y is more general than X ! X.
58 X ! X is more general than  ! .
 X ! X is more general than ( ! ) ! ( ! ).
 Neither of  !  and ( ! ) ! ( ! ) is more general than the other. We
say that these types are incomparable.
 X ! Y is more general than W ! Z, and vice versa. We say that X ! Y
and W ! Z are equally general.
We can also speak of one substitution being more general than another:
Deﬁnition. If  and  are type substitutions, we say that  is more general than 
if there exists a type substitution  such that     = .
7.3 Uniﬁers
We will be concerned with solving equations between type templates. The basic
question is not very different from solving equations in arithmetic: given an equa-
tion between expressions, for instance x+y = x2, is it possible to ﬁnd values for
x and y which make the equation true? The answer is yes in this case, for instance
x = 2;y = 2 is one solution, and x = 1;y = 0 is another possible solution. We
can even give the most general solution, which is x = arbitrary;y = x2   x.
Similarly, for type templates, we might ask whether an equation such as
X ! (X ! Y ) = (Y ! Z) ! W
has anysolutions. Theansweris yes, andonesolution,forinstance, is X =  ! ,
Y = , Z = , W = ( ! ) ! . But this is not the most general solution; the
most general solution, in this case, is Y = arbitrary, Z = arbitrary, X = Y ! Z,
W = (Y ! Z) ! Y .
We use substitutions to represent the solutions to such equations. For instance, the
mostgeneralsolutiontothesampleequationfromthelastparagraphisrepresented
by the substitution
 = [X 7! Y ! Z;W 7! (Y ! Z) ! Y ]:
If a substitution  solves the equation A = B in this way, then we also say that 
is a uniﬁer of A and B.
59To give another example, consider the equation
X  (X ! Z) = (Z ! Y )  Y:
This equation does not have any solution, because we would have to have both
X = Z ! Y and Y = X ! Z, which implies X = Z ! (X ! Z), which
is impossible to solve in simple types. We also say that X  (X ! Z) and
(Z ! Y )  Y cannot be uniﬁed.
In general, we will be concerned with solving not just single equations, but sys-
tems of several equations. The formal deﬁnition of uniﬁers and most general
uniﬁers is as follows:
Deﬁnition. Given two sequences of type templates  A = A1;:::;An and  B =
B1;:::;Bn, we say that a type substitution  is a uniﬁer of  A and  B if  Ai =
 Bi, for all i = 1:::n. Moreover, we say that  is a most general uniﬁer of  A
and  B if it is a uniﬁer, and if it is more general than any other uniﬁer of  A and  B.
7.4 The uniﬁcation algorithm
Uniﬁcationis the process of determining a most generaluniﬁer. Morespeciﬁcally,
uniﬁcation is an algorithm whose input are two sequences of type templates  A =
A1;:::;An and  B = B1;:::;Bn, and whose output is either “failure”, if no
uniﬁer exists, or else a most general uniﬁer . We call this algorithm mgu for
“most general uniﬁer”, and we write mgu(  A;  B) for the result of applying the
algorithm to  A and  B.
Before we state the algorithm, let us note that we only use ﬁnitely many type
variables, namely, the ones that occur in  A and  B. In particular, the substitu-
tions generated by this algorithm are ﬁnite objects which can be represented and
manipulated by a computer.
The algorithm for calculating mgu(  A;  B) is as follows. By convention, the algo-
rithm choses the ﬁrst applicable clause in the following list. Note that the algo-
rithm is recursive.
1. mgu(X;X) = id, the identity substitution.
2. mgu(X;B) = [X 7! B], if X does not occur in B.
3. mgu(X;B) fails, if X occurs in B and B 6= X.
604. mgu(A;Y ) = [Y 7! A], if Y does not occur in A.
5. mgu(A;Y ) fails, if Y occurs in A and A 6= Y .
6. mgu(;) = id.
7. mgu(A1 ! A2;B1 ! B2) = mgu(A1;A2;B1;B2).
8. mgu(A1  A2;B1  B2) = mgu(A1;A2;B1;B2).
9. mgu(1;1) = id.
10. mgu(A;B) fails, in all other cases.
11. mgu(A;  A;B;  B) =    , where  = mgu(  A;  B) and  = mgu( A;  B).
Note that clauses 1–10 calculate the most general uniﬁer of two type templates,
whereasclause11dealswith lists oftypetemplates. Clause10is acatch-allclause
which fails if none of the earlier clauses apply. In particular, this clause causes the
following to fail: mgu(A1 ! A2;B1  B2), mgu(A1 ! A2;), etc.
Proposition 7.1. If mgu(  A;  B) = , then  is a most general uniﬁer of  A and  B.
If mgu(  A;  B) fails, then  A and  B have no uniﬁer.
Proof. First, it is easy to prove by induction on the deﬁnition of mgu that if
mgu(  A;  B) = , then  is a uniﬁer of  A and  B. This is evident in all cases
except perhaps clause 11: but here, by induction hypothesis,    A =    B and
 ( A) =  ( B), hence also  ( (A;  A)) =  ( (B;  B)). Here we have used
the evident notation of applying a substitution to a list of type templates.
Second, we prove that if  A and  B can be uniﬁed, then mgu(  A;  B) returns a most
general uniﬁer. This is again proved by induction. For example, in clause 2, we
have  = [X 7! B]. Suppose  is another uniﬁer of X and B. Then  X =  B.
We claim that     = . But  ((X)) =  (B) =  (X) = (X), whereas if
Y 6= X, then  ((Y )) =  (Y ) = (Y ). Hence    = , and it follows that  is
moregeneral than . Theclauses 1–10 all followby similar arguments. For clause
11, suppose that A;  A and B;  B have some uniﬁer 0. Then 0 is also a uniﬁer for
 A and  B, and thus the recursive call return a most general uniﬁer  of  A and  B.
Since  is more general than 0, we have     = 0 for some substitution . But
then  ( A) =  0A =  0B =  ( B), hence   is a uniﬁer for  A and  B. By
induction hypothesis,  = mgu( A;  B) exists and is a most general uniﬁer for
 A and  B. It follows that  is more general than  , thus  0   =  , for some
substitution 0. Finally we need to show that  =     is more general than 0.
But this follows because  0   =  0      =     = 0. 
61Remark. Proving that the algorithm mgu terminates is tricky. In particular, termi-
nation can’t be proved by induction on the size of the arguments, because in the
second recursive call in clause 11, the application of   may well increase the size
of the arguments. To prove termination, note that each substitution  generated by
the algorithm is either the identity, or else it eliminates at least one variable. We
can use this to prove termination by nested induction on the number of variables
and on the size of the arguments. We leave the details for another time.
7.5 The type inference algorithm
Given the uniﬁcation algorithm, type inference is now relatively easy. We for-
mulate another algorithm, typeinfer, which takes a typing judgment   ` M : B
as its input (using templates instead of types, and not necessarily a valid typing
judgment). The algorithm either outputs a most general substitution  such that
   ` M :  B is a valid typing judgment, or if no such  exists, the algorithm
fails.
Inotherwords,thealgorithmcalculatesthemostgeneralsubstitutionwhichmakes
the given typing judgment valid. It is deﬁned as follows:
1. typeinfer(x1:A1;:::;xn:An ` xi : B) = mgu(Ai;B).
2. typeinfer(  ` MN : B) =  ,where = typeinfer(  ` M : X ! B),
 = typeinfer(   ` N :  X), for a fresh type variable X.
3. typeinfer(  ` xA:M : B) =    , where  = mgu(B;A ! X) and
 = typeinfer(  ;x: A ` M :  X), for a fresh type variable X.
4. typeinfer(  ` hM;Ni : A) =       , where  = mgu(A;X  Y ),
 = typeinfer(   ` M :  X), and  = typeinfer(    ` N :   Y ), for
fresh type variables X and Y .
5. typeinfer(  ` 1M : A) = typeinfer(  ` M : A  Y ), for a fresh type
variable Y .
6. typeinfer(  ` 2M : B) = typeinfer(  ` M : X  B), for a fresh type
variable X.
7. typeinfer(  `  : A) = mgu(A;1).
62Strictly speaking, the algorithm is non-deterministic, because some of the clauses
involve choosing one or more fresh type variables, and the choice is arbitrary.
However, the choice is not essential, since we may regard all fresh type variables
are equivalent. Here, a type variable is called “fresh” if it has never been used.
Note that the algorithm typeinfer can fail; this happens if and only if the call to
mgu fails in steps 1, 3, 4, or 7.
Also note that the algorithm obviously always terminates; this follows by induc-
tion on M, since each recursive call only uses a smaller term M.
Proposition 7.2. If there exists a substitution  such that    ` M :  B is a valid
typing judgment, then typeinfer(  ` M : B) will return a most general such
substitution. Otherwise, the algorithm will fail.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 7.1. 
Finally, the question “is M typeable” can be answered by choosing distinct type
variables X1;:::;Xn;Y and applyingthe algorithm typeinfer to the typing judg-
mentx1:X1;:::;xn:Xn ` M : Y . Notethatifthealgorithmsucceedsandreturns
asubstitution, thenY is themostgeneraltypeofM,andthefreevariableshave
types x1:X1;:::;xn:Xn.
8 Denotational semantics
We introduced the lambda calculus as the “theory of functions”. But so far, we
have only spoken of functions in abstract terms. Do lambda terms correspond to
any actual functions, such as, functions in set theory? And what about the notions
of - and -equivalence? We intuitively accepted these concepts as expressing
truths about the equality of functions. But do these properties really hold of real
functions? Are there other properties that functions have which are not captured
by -equivalence?
The word “semantics” comes from the Greek word for “meaning”. Denotational
semantics means to give meaning to a language by interpreting its terms as math-
ematical objects. This is done by describing a function which maps syntactic
objects (e.g., types, terms) to semantic objects (e.g., sets, elements). This function
is called an interpretation or meaning function, and we usually denote it by [[ ]].
Thus, if M is a term, we will usually write [[M]] for the meaning of M under a
given interpretation.
63Any good denotational semantics should be compositional, which means, the in-
terpretation of a term should be given in terms of the interpretations of its sub-
terms. Thus, for example, [[MN]] should be a function of [[M]] and [[N]].
Suppose that we have an axiomatic notion of equality ' on terms (for instance,
-equivalence in the case of the lambda calculus). With respect to a particular
class of interpretations, soundness is the property
M ' N ) [[M]] = [[N]] for all interpretations in the class:
Completeness is the property
[[M]] = [[N]] for all interpretations in the class ) M ' N:
Dependingonourviewpoint, wewill eithersaytheaxiomsaresound(withrespect
to a given interpretation), or the interpretation is sound (with respect to a given set
of axioms). Similarly for completeness. Soundness expresses the fact that our ax-
ioms (e.g.,  or ) are true with respect to the given interpretation. Completeness
expresses the fact that our axioms are sufﬁcient.
8.1 Set-theoretic interpretation
The simply-typed lambda calculus can be given a straightforward set-theoretic
interpretation as follows. We map types to sets and typing judgments to functions.
For each basic type , assume that we have chosen a non-empty set S. We can
then associate a set [[A]] to each type A recursively:
[[]] = S
[[A ! B]] = [[B]][[A]]
[[A  B]] = [[A]]  [[B]]
[[1]] = fg
Here, for two sets X;Y , we write Y X for the set of all functions from X to Y ,
i.e., Y X = ff j f : X ! Y g. Of course, X  Y denotes the usual cartesian
product of sets, and fg is some singleton set.
We can now interpret lambda terms, or more precisely, typing judgments, as cer-
tain functions. Intuitively, we already know which function a typing judgment
corresponds to. For instance, the typing judgment x:A;f:A ! B ` fx : B
corresponds to the function which takes an element x 2 [[A]] and an element
64f 2 [[B]][[A]], and which returns f(x) 2 [[B]]. In general, the interpretation of a
typing judgment
x1:A1;:::;xn:An ` M : B
will be a function
[[A1]]  :::  [[An]] ! [[B]]:
Which particular function it is depends ofcourseonthe term M. For convenience,
if   = x1:A1;:::;xn:An is a context, let us write [[ ]] = [[A1]] :::  [[An]]. We
now deﬁne [[  ` M : B]] by recursion on M.
 If M is a variable, we deﬁne
[[x1:A1;:::;xn:An ` xi : Ai]] = i : [[A1]]  :::  [[An]] ! [[Ai]];
where i(a1;:::;an) = ai.
 If M = NP is an application, we recursively calculate
f = [[  ` N : A ! B]] : [[ ]] ! [[B]][[A]];
g = [[  ` P : A]] : [[ ]] ! [[A]]:
We then deﬁne
[[  ` NP : B]] = h : [[ ]] ! [[B]]
by h( a) = f( a)(g( a)), for all  a 2 [[ ]].
 If M = xA:N is an abstraction, we recursively calculate
f = [[ ;x:A ` N : B]] : [[ ]]  [[A]] ! [[B]]:
We then deﬁne
[[  ` xA:N : A ! B]] = h : [[ ]] ! [[B]][[A]]
by h( a)(a) = f( a;a), for all  a 2 [[ ]] and a 2 [[A]].
 If M = hN;Pi is an pair, we recursively calculate
f = [[  ` N : A]] : [[ ]] ! [[A]];
g = [[  ` P : B]] : [[ ]] ! [[B]]:
We then deﬁne
[[  ` hN;Pi : A  B]] = h : [[ ]] ! [[A]]  [[B]]
by h( a) = (f( a);g( a)), for all  a 2 [[ ]].
65 If M = iN is a projection (for i = 1;2), we recursively calculate
f = [[  ` N : B1  B2]] : [[ ]] ! [[B1]]  [[B2]]:
We then deﬁne
[[  ` i : Bi]] = h : [[ ]] ! [[Bi]]
by h( a) = i(f( a)), for all  a 2 [[ ]]. Here i in the meta-language denotes
the set-theoretic function i : [[B1]]  [[B2]] ! [[Bi]] given by i(b1;b2) =
bi.
 If M = , we deﬁne
[[  `  : 1]] = h : [[ ]] ! fg
by h( a) = , for all  a 2 [[ ]].
To minimize notational inconvenience, we will occasionally abuse the notation
and write [[M]] instead of [[  ` M : B]], thus pretending that terms are typing
judgments. However, this is only an abbreviation, and it will be understood that
the interpretation really depends on the typing judgment, and not just the term,
even if we use the abbreviated notation.
8.2 Soundness
Lemma 8.1 (Context change). The interpretation behaves as expected under
reordering of contexts and under the addition of dummy variables to contexts.
More precisely, if  : f1;:::;ng ! f1;:::;mg is an injective map, and if the
free variables of M are among x1;:::;xn, then the interpretations of the two
typing judgments,
f = [[x1:A1;:::;xm:Am ` M : B]] : [[A1]]  :::  [[Am]] ! [[B]];
g = [[x1:A1;:::;xn:An ` M : B]] : [[A1]]  :::  [[An]] ! [[B]]
are related as follows:
f(a1;:::;am) = g(a1;:::;an);
for all a1 2 [[A1]];:::;am 2 [[Am]].
Proof. Easy, but tedious, induction on M. 
66The signiﬁcance of this lemma is that, to a certain extent, the context does not
matter. Thus, if the free variables of M and N are contained in   as well as  0,
then we have
[[  ` M : B]] = [[  ` N : B]] iff [[ 0 ` M : B]] = [[ 0 ` N : B]]:
Thus, whether M and N have equal denotations only depends on M and N, and
not on  .
Lemma 8.2 (Substitution Lemma). If
[[ ;x:A ` M : B]] = f : [[ ]]  [[A]] ! [[B]] and
[[  ` N : A]] = g : [[ ]] ! [[A]];
then
[[  ` M[N=x] : B]] = h : [[ ]] ! [[B]];
where h( a) = f( a;g( a)), for all  a 2 [[ ]].
Proof. Very easy, but very tedious, induction on M. 
Proposition 8.3 (Soundness). The set-theoretic interpretation is sound for -
reasoning. In other words,
M = N ) [[  ` M : B]] = [[  ` N : B]]:
Proof. Let us write M  N if [[  ` M : B]] = [[Gamma ` N : B]]. By the
remark after Lemma 8.1, this notion is independent of  , and thus a well-deﬁned
relation on terms (as opposed to typing judgments). To prove soundness, we must
show that M = N implies M  N, for all M and N. It sufﬁces to show that
 satisﬁes all the axioms of -equivalence.
The axioms (reﬂ), (symm), and (trans) hold trivially. Similarly, all the (cong) and
() rules hold, due to the fact that the meaning of composite terms was deﬁned
solely in terms of the meaning of their subterms. It remains to prove that each of
the various () and () laws is satisﬁed (see page 45). We prove the rule (!) as
an example; the remaining rules are left as an exercise.
Assume   is a context such that  ;x:A ` M : B and   ` N : A. Let
f = [[ ;x:A ` M : B]] : [[ ]]  [[A]] ! [[B]];
g = [[  ` N : A]] : [[ ]] ! [[A]];
h = [[  ` (xA:M) : A ! B]] : [[ ]] ! [[B]][[A]];
k = [[  ` (xA:M)N : B]] : [[ ]] ! [[B]];
l = [[  ` M[N=x] : B]] : [[ ]] ! [[B]]:
67We must show k = h. By deﬁnition, we have k( a) = h( a)(g( a)) = f( a;g( a)).
On the other hand, l( a) = f( a;g( a)) by the substitution lemma. 
Note that the proof of soundness amounts to a simple calculation; while there are
many details to attend to, no particularly interesting new idea is required. This
is typical of soundness proofs in general. Completeness, on the other hand, is
usually much more difﬁcult to prove and often requires clever ideas.
8.3 Completeness
We cite two completeness theorems for the set-theoretic interpretation. The ﬁrst
one is for the class of all models with ﬁnite base type. The second one is for the
single model with one countably inﬁnite base type.
Theorem 8.4 (Completeness, Plotkin, 1973). The class of set-theoretic models
with ﬁnite base types is complete for the lambda- calculus.
Recall that completeness for a class of models means that if [[M]] = [[N]] holds in
all models of the given class, then M = N. This is not the same as complete-
ness for each individual model in the class.
Note that, for each ﬁxed choice of ﬁnite sets as the interpretations of the base
types, there are some lambda terms such that [[M]] = [[N]] but M 6= N. For
instance, consider terms of type ( ! ) !  ! . There are inﬁnitely many
-distinct terms of this type, namely, the Church numerals. On the other hand,
if S is a ﬁnite set, then [[( ! ) !  ! ]] is also a ﬁnite set. Since a ﬁnite
set cannot have inﬁnitely many distinct elements, there must necessarily be two
distinct Church numerals M;N such that [[M]] = [[N]].
Plotkin’s completeness theorem, on the other hand, shows that whenever M and
N are distinct lambda terms, then there exist some set-theoretic model with ﬁnite
base types in which M and N are different.
The second completeness theorem is for a single model, namely the one where S 
is a countably inﬁnite set.
Theorem 8.5 (Completeness, Friedman, 1975). The set-theoretic model with
base type equal to N, the set of natural numbers, is complete for the lambda-
calculus.
We omit the proofs.
689 Complete partial orders
9.1 Why are sets not enough, in general?
The use of plain sets to interpret types of the lambda calculus is somewhat crude.
Later we are going to add a ﬁxpoint operator to the typed lambda calculus, which
assigns a ﬁxpoint to each term of type A ! A. It is clear that, in the set-theoretic
model, there are many functions from a set A to itself which do not have a ﬁx-
point; thus, there is no chance we are going to ﬁnd an interpretation for a ﬁxpoint
operator in the simple set-theoretic model.
On the other hand, if A and B are types, there are generally many functions f :
[[A]] ! [[B]] in the set-theoretic model which are not deﬁnable by lambda terms.
For instance, if [[A]] and [[B]] are inﬁnite sets, then there are uncountably many
functions f : [[A]] ! [[B]]; however, there are only countably many lambda terms,
and thus there are necessarily going to be functions which are not the denotation
of any lambda term.
Theideais to putadditional structure onthesets thatinterpret types, andto require
functions to preserve that structure. This is going to cut down the size of the
function spaces, decreasing the “slack” between the functions deﬁnable in the
lambda calculus and the functions that exist in the model, and simultaneously
increasing the chances that additional structure, such as ﬁxpoint operators, might
exist in the model.
Complete partial orders are one such structure which is commonly used for this
purpose. The method is originally due to Dana Scott.
9.2 Complete partial orders
Deﬁnition. A partially ordered set or poset is a set X together with a binary
relation v satisfying
 reﬂexivity: for all x 2 X, x v x,
 antisymmetry: for all x;y 2 X, x v y and y v x implies x = y,
 transitivity: for all x;y;z 2 X, x v y and y v z implies x v z.
The concept of a partial order differs from a total order in that we do not require
that for any x and y, either x v y or y v x. Thus, in a partially ordered set it is
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Figure 4: Some posets
permissible to have incomparable elements.
We can often visualize posets, particularly ﬁnite ones, by drawing their line dia-
grams as in Figure 4. In these diagrams, we put one circle for each element of
X, and we draw an edge from x upward to y if x v y and there is no z with
x v z v y. Such line diagrams are also known as Hasse diagrams.
The idea behind using a partial order to denote computational values is that x v y
means that x is less deﬁned thany. For instance, if a certain term diverges, then its
denotation will be less deﬁned than, or below that of a term which has a deﬁnite
value. Similarly, a function is more deﬁned than another if it converges on more
inputs.
Another important idea in using posets for modeling computational value is that
of approximation. We can think of some inﬁnite computational object (such as, an
inﬁnite stream), to be a limit of successive ﬁnite approximations (such as, longer
and longer ﬁnite streams). Thus we also read x v y as x approximates y. A
complete partial order is a poset in which every countable chain of increasing
elements approximates something.
Deﬁnition. Let X be a poset and let A  X be a subset. We say that x 2 X is
an upper bound for A if x v a for all a 2 A. We say that x is a least upper bound
for A if x is an upper bound, and whenever y is also an upper bound, then x v y.
Deﬁnition. An !-chain in a poset X is a sequence of elements x0;x1;x2;:::
70such that
x0 v x1 v x2 v :::
Deﬁnition. A complete partial order (cpo) is a poset such that every !-chain of
elements has a least upper bound.
If x0;x1;x2;::: is an !-chain of elements in a cpo, we write B B  i2N xi for the least
upper bound. We also call the least upper bound the limit of the !-chain.
Not every poset is a cpo. In Figure 4, the poset labeled ! is not a cpo, because the
evident !-chain does not have a least upper bound (in fact, it has no upper bound
at all). The other posets shown in Figure 4 are cpos.
9.3 Properties of limits
Proposition 9.1. 1. Monotonicity. Suppose fxigi and fyigi are !-chains in
a cpo C, such that xi v yi for all i. Then
B B  
i
xi v B B  
i
yi:
2. Exchange. Suppose fxijgi;j2N is a doubly monotone double sequence of
elements of a cpo C, i.e., whenever i 6 i0 and j 6 j0, then xij v xi0j0.
Then
B B  
i2N
B B  
j2N
xij = B B  
j2N
B B  
i2N
xij:
In particular, all limits shown are well-deﬁned.
Exercise 9.1. Prove Proposition 9.1.
9.4 Continuous functions
If we model data types as cpo’s, it is natural to model algorithms as functions
from cpo’s to cpo’s. These functions are subject to two constraints: they have to
be monotone and continuous.
Deﬁnition. A function f : C ! D between posets C and D is said to be mono-
tone if for all x;y 2 C,
x v y ) f(x) v f(y):
71A function f : C ! D between cpo’s C and D is said to be continuous if it is
monotone and it preserves least upper bounds of !-chains, i.e., for all !-chains
fxigi2N in C,
f( B B  
i2N
xi) = B B  
i2N
f(xi):
The intuitive explanation for the monotonicity requirement is that information is
“positive”: more information in the input cannot lead to less information in the
output of an algorithm. The intuitive explanation for the continuity requirement is
that any particular output of an algorithm can only depend on a ﬁnite amount of
input.
9.5 Pointed cpo’s and strict functions
Deﬁnition. A cpo is said to be pointed if it has a least element. The least element
is usually denoted ? and pronounced “bottom”. All cpo’s shown in Figure 4 are
pointed.
A coninuous function between pointed cpo’s is said to be strict if it preserves the
bottom element.
9.6 Products and function spaces
If C and D are cpo’s, then their cartesian product C  D is also a cpo, with the
pointwise order given by (x;y) v (x0;y0) iff x v x0 and y v y0. Least upper
bounds are also given pointwise, thus
B B  
i
(xi;yi) = (B B  
i
xi;B B  
i
yi):
Proposition 9.2. The ﬁrst and second projections, 1 : C  D ! C and 2 :
C  D ! D, are continuous functions. Moreover, if f : E ! C and g : E ! D
are continuous functions, then so is the function h : E ! C D given by h(z) =
(f(z);g(z)).
IfC andD arecpo’s, thentheset ofcontinuousfunctions f : C ! D forms a cpo,
denoted DC. The order is given pointwise: given two functions f;g : C ! D,
we say that
f v g iff for all x 2 C, f(x) v g(x):
72Proposition 9.3. The set DC of continuous functions from C to D, together with
the order just deﬁned, is a complete partial order.
Proof. Clearly the set DC is partially ordered. What we must show is that least
upper bounds of !-chains exist. Given an !-chain f0;f1;::: in DC, we deﬁne
g 2 DC to be the pointwise limit, i.e.,
g(x) = B B  
i2N
fi(x);
for all x 2 C. Note that ffi(x)gi does indeed form an !-chain in C, so that g is a
well-deﬁned function. We claim that g is the least upper bound of ff igi. First we
need to show that g is indeed an element of DC. To see that g is monotone, we
use Proposition 9.1(1) and calculate, for any x v y 2 C,
g(x) = B B  
i2N
fi(x) v B B  
i2N
fi(y) = g(y):
To see that g is continuous, we use Proposition 9.1(2) and calculate, for any !-
chain x0;x1;::: in C,
g(B B  
j
xj) = B B  
i
B B  
j
fi(xj) = B B  
j
B B  
i
fi(xj) = B B  
j
g(xj):
Finally, we must show that g is the least upper bound of the ffigi. Clearly, fi v g
for all i, so that g is an upper bound. Now suppose h 2 D C is any other upper
bound of ffig. Then for all x, fi(x) v h(x). Since g(x) was deﬁned to be the
least upper bound of ffi(x)gi, we then have g(x) v h(x). Since this holds for all
x, we have g v h. Thus g is indeed the least upper bound.
Exercise 9.2. Recall the cpo B from Figure 4. The cpo BB is also shown in
Figure 4. Its 11 elements correspond to the 11 continuous functions from B to B.
Label the elements of BB with the functions they correspond to.
Proposition 9.4. The application function DC  C ! D, which maps (f;x) to
f(x), is continuous.
Proposition 9.5. Continuous functions can be continuously curried and uncur-
ried. In other words, if f : C  D ! E is a continuous function, then f  : C !
ED, deﬁned by f (x)(y) = f(x;y), is well-deﬁned and continuous. Conversely,
if g : C ! ED is a continuous function, then g : C  D ! E, deﬁned by
g(x;y) = g(x)(y), is well-deﬁned and continuous. Moreover, (f ) = f and
(g) = g.
739.7 The interpretation of the simply-typed lambda calculus in
complete partial orders
The interpretation of the simply-typed lambda calculus in cpo’s resembles the set-
theoretic interpretation, except that types are interpreted by cpo’s instead of sets,
and typing judgments are interpreted as continuous functions.
For each basic type , assume that we have chosen a pointed cpo S. We can then
associate a pointed cpo [[A]] to each type A recursively:
[[]] = S
[[A ! B]] = [[B]][[A]]
[[A  B]] = [[A]]  [[B]]
[[1]] = 1
Typing judgments are now interpreted as continuous functions
[[A1]]  :::  [[An]] ! [[B]]
in precisely the same way as they were deﬁned for the set-theoretic interpretation.
The only thing we need to check, at every step, is that the function deﬁned is
indeed continuous. For variables, this follows from the fact that projections of
cartesian products are continuous (Proposition 9.2). For applications, we use the
fact that the application function of cpo’s is continuous (Proposition 9.4), and for
lambda-abstractions, we use the fact that currying is a well-deﬁned, continuous
operation (Proposition 9.5). Finally, the continuity of the maps associated with
products and projections follows from Proposition 9.2.
Proposition9.6(Soundness andCompleteness). Theinterpretationofthesimply-
typed lambda calculus in pointed cpo’s is sound and complete with respect to the
lambda- calculus.
9.8 Cpo’s and ﬁxpoints
One of the reasons, mentioned in the introduction to this section, for using cpo’s
instead of sets for the interpretation of the simply-typed lambda calculus is that
cpo’s admit ﬁxpoint, and thus they can be used to interpret an extension of the
lambda calculus with a ﬁxpoint operator.
Proposition 9.7. Let C be a pointed cpo and let f : C ! C be a continuous
function. Then f has a least ﬁxpoint.
74Proof. Deﬁne x0 = ? and xi+1 = f(xi), for all i 2 N. The resulting sequence
fxigi is an !-chain, because clearly x0 v x1 (since x0 is the least element), and
if xi v xi+1, then f(xi) v f(xi+1) by monotonicity, hence xi+1 v xi+2. It
follows by induction that xi v xi+1. Let x = B B  i xi be the limit of this !-chain.
Then using continuity of f, we have
f(x) = f(B B  
i
xi) = B B  
i
f(xi) = B B  
i
xi+1 = x:
If f : C ! C is any continuous function, let us write f y for its least ﬁxpoint.
We claim that fy depends continuously on f, i.e., that y : C C ! C deﬁnes a
continuous function.
Proposition 9.8. The function y : CC ! C, which assigns to each continuous
function f 2 CC its least ﬁxpoint fy 2 C, is continuous.
Exercise 9.3. Prove Proposition 9.8.
Thus, if we add to the simply-typed lambda calculus a family of ﬁxpoint opera-
tors YA : (A ! A) ! A, the resulting extended lambda calculus can then be
interpreted in cpo’s by letting
[[YA]] = y : [[A]]
[[A]] ! [[A]]:
9.9 Example: Streams
Consider streams of characters fromsome alphabet A. Let A6! be the set of ﬁnite
or inﬁnite sequences of characters. We order A by the preﬁx ordering: if s and t
are(ﬁniteorinﬁnite)sequences,wesay s v t ifs is apreﬁxoft, i.e.,if thereexists
a sequence s0 such that t = ss0. Note that if s v t and s is an inﬁnite sequence,
then necessarily s = t, i.e., the inﬁnite sequences are the maximal elements with
respect to this order.
Exercise 9.4. Prove that the set A6! forms a cpo under the preﬁx ordering.
Exercise9.5. Consideranautomatonwhichreadscharacters fromaninputstream
and writes characters to an output stream. For each input character read, it can
write zero, one, or more output characters. Discuss how such an automaton gives
rise to a continuous function from A6! ! A6!. In particular, explain the mean-
ing of monotonicity and continuity in this context. Give some examples.
7510 The language PCF
PCF stands for “programming with computable functions”. The language PCF is
an extensionof the simply-typed lambdacalculus with booleans, natural numbers,
and recursion. It was ﬁrst introduced by Dana Scott as a simple programming lan-
guageonwhichtotryouttechniquesforreasoningaboutprograms. AlthoughPCF
is not intended as a “real world” programming language, many real programming
languages can be regarded as (syntactic variants of) extensions of PCF, and many
of the reasoning techniques developed for PCF also apply to more complicated
languages.
PCF is a “programming language”, not just a “calculus”. By this we mean, PCF
is equipped with a speciﬁc evaluation order, or rules that determine precisely how
terms are to be evaluated. We follow the slogan:
Programming language = syntax + evaluation rules.
After introducting the syntax of PCF, we will look at three different equivalence
relations on terms.
 Axiomatic equivalence =ax will be given by axioms in the spirit of -
equivalence.
 Operational equivalence =op will be deﬁned in terms of the operational
behavior of terms. Two terms are operationally equivalent if one can be
substituted for the other in any context without changing the behavior of a
program.
 Denotational equivalence =den is deﬁned via a denotational semantics.
We will develop methods for reasoning about these equivalences, and thus for
reasoning about programs. We will also investigate how the three equivalences
are related to each other.
10.1 Syntax and typing rules
PCF types are simple types over two base types bool and nat.
A;B ::= bool nat A ! B A  B 1
76(true)
  ` T : bool
(false)
  ` F : bool
(zero)
  ` zero : nat
(succ)   ` M : nat
  ` succ(M) : nat
(pred)   ` M : nat
  ` pred(M) : nat
(iszero)   ` M : nat
  ` iszero(M) : bool
(ﬁx)   ` M : A ! A
  ` Y(M) : A
(if)   ` M : bool   ` N : A   ` P : A
  ` if M then N else P : A
Table 4: Typing rules for PCF
The raw terms of PCF are those of the simply-typed lambda calculus, together
with some additional constructs that deal with booleans, natural numbers, and
recursion.
M;N;P ::= x MN xA:M hM;Ni 1M 2M 
T F zero succ(M) pred(M)
iszero(M) if M then N else P Y(M)
The intended meaning of these terms is the same as that of the corresponding
terms we used to program in the untyped lambda calculus: T and F are the
boolean constants, zero is the constant zero, succ and pred are the successor
and predecessor functions, iszero tests whether a given number is equal to zero,
if M then N else P is a conditional, and Y(M) is a ﬁxpoint of M.
The typing rules for PCF are the same as the typing rules for the simply-typed
lambda calculus, shown in Table 2, plus the additional typing rules shown in Ta-
ble 4.
10.2 Axiomatic equivalence
The axiomatic equivalence of PCF is based on the -equivalence of the simply-
typed lambda calculus. The relation =ax is the least relation given by the follow-
ing:
77pred(zero) = zero
pred(succ(n)) = n
iszero(zero) = T
iszero(succ(n)) = F
if Tthen N else P = N
if Fthen N else P = P
Y(M) = M(Y(M))
Table 5: Axiomatic equivalence for PCF
 All the - and -axioms of the simply-typed lambda calculus, as shown on
page 45.
 One congruence or -rule for each term constructor. This means, for in-
stance
M =ax M0 N =ax N0 P =ax P 0
if M then N else P =ax if M0 then N0 else P0;
and similar for all the other term constructors.
 The additional axioms shown in Table 5. Here, n stands for a numeral, i.e.,
a term of the form succ(:::(succ(zero)):::).
10.3 Operational semantics
The operational semantics of PCF is commonly given in two different styles: the
small-step or shallow style, and the big-step or deep style. We give the small-
step semantics ﬁrst, because it is closer to the notion of -reduction which we
considered for the simply-typed lambda calculus.
There are some important differences between an operational semantics, as we
are goingto giveit here, andthe notionof -reduction in the simply-typed lambda
calculus. Most importantly, the operational semantics is goingto be deterministic,
which means, each term can be reduced in at most one way. Thus, there will never
be a choice between more than one redex. Or in other words, it will always be
uniquely speciﬁed which redex to reduce next.
As a consequenceoftheprevious paragraph,we will abandonmanyofthe congru-
ence rules, as well as the ()-rule. We adopt the following informal conventions:
78 never reduce the body of a lambda abstraction,
 never reduce the argumentof a function (except forprimitive functions such
as succ and pred),
 never reduce the “then” or “else” part of an if-then-else statement,
 never reduce a term inside a pair.
Of course, the terms which these rules prevent from being reduced can neverthe-
less become subject to reduction later: the body of a lambda abstraction and the
argument of a function can be reduced after a -reduction causes the  to disap-
pear and the argument to be substituted in the body. The “then” or “else” parts
of an if-then-else term can be reduced after the “if” part evaluates to true or false.
And the terms inside a pair can be reduced after the pair has been broken up by a
projection.
An important technical notion is that of a value, which is a term that represents
the result of a computation and cannot be reduced further. Values are given as
follows:
Values: V;W ::= T F zero succ(V )  hM;Ni xA:M
The transition rules for the small-step operational semantics of PCF are shown in
Table 6.
We write M ! N if M reduces to N by these rules. We write M 6! if there
does not exist N such that M ! N. The ﬁrst two important technical properties
of small-step reduction are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 10.1. 1. Values are normal forms. If V is a value, then V 6!.
2. Evalution is deterministic. If M ! N and M ! N 0, then N  N0.
Another important property is subject reduction: a well-typed term reduces only
to another well-typed term of the same type.
Lemma 10.2 (Subject Reduction). If   ` M : A and M ! N, then   ` N : A.
Next, we want to prove that the evaluation of a well-typed term does not get
“stuck”. If M is some term such that M 6!, but M is not a value, then we
regard this as an error, and we also write M ! error. Examples of such terms
are 1(x:M) and hM;NiP. The following lemma shows that well-typed closed
terms cannot lead to such errors.
79M ! N
pred(M) ! pred(N)
pred(zero) ! zero
pred(succ(V )) ! V
M ! N
iszero(M) ! iszero(N)
iszero(zero) ! T
iszero(succ(V )) ! F
M ! N
succ(M) ! succ(N)
M ! N
MP ! NP
(xA:M)N ! M[N=x]
M ! M0
iM ! iM0
1hM;Ni ! M
2hM;Ni ! N
M : 1; M 6= 
M ! 
M ! M0
if M then N else P ! if M0 then N else P
if Tthen N else P ! N
if Fthen N else P ! P
Y(M) ! M(Y(M))
Table 6: Small-step operational semantics of PCF
Lemma 10.3 (Progress). If M is a closed, well-typed term, then either M is a
value, or else there exists N such that M ! N.
The Progress Lemma is very important, because it implies that a well-typed term
cannot “go wrong”. It guarantees that a well-typed term will either evaluate to a
value in ﬁnitely many steps, or else it will reduce inﬁnitely and thus not terminate.
But a well-typed term can never generate an error. In programming language
terms, a term which type-checks at compile-time cannot generate an error at run-
time.
To express this idea formally, let us write M ! N in the usual way if M reduces
to N in zero or more steps, and let us write M ! error if M reduces in zero or
more steps to an error.
Proposition 10.4 (Safety). If M is a closed, well-typed term, then M 6! error.
Exercise 10.1. Prove Lemmas 10.1–10.3 and Proposition 10.4.
80T + T
F + F
zero + zero
hM;Ni + hM;Ni
xA:M + xA:M
M + zero
pred(M) + zero
M + succ(V )
pred(M) + V
M + zero
iszero(M) + T
M + succ(V )
iszero(M) + F
M + V
succ(M) + succ(V )
M + xA:M0 M0[N=x] + V
MN + V
M + hM1;M2i M1 + V
1M + V
M + hM1;M2i M2 + V
2M + V
M : 1
M + 
M + T N + V
if M then N else P + V
M + F P + V
if M then N else P + V
M(Y(M)) + V
Y(M) + V
Table 7: Big-step operational semantics of PCF
10.4 Big-step semantics
In the small-step semantics, if M ! V , we say that M evaluates to V . Note that
by determinacy, for every M, there exists at most one V such that M ! V .
It is also possible to axiomatize the relation “M evaluates to V ” directly. This is
known as the big-step semantics. Here, we write M + V if M evaluates to V .
The axioms for the big-step semantics are shown in Table 7.
The big-step semantics satisﬁes properties similar to those of the small-step se-
mantics.
Lemma 10.5. 1. Values. For all values V , we have V + V .
2. Determinacy. If M + V and M + V 0, then V  V 0.
3. Subject Reduction. If   ` M : A and M + V , then   ` V : A.
81The analogues of the Progress and Safety properties cannot be as easily stated for
big-step reduction, because we cannot easily talk about a single reduction step or
about inﬁnite reduction sequences. However, some comfort can be taken in the
fact that the big-step semantics and small-step semantics coincide:
Proposition 10.6. M ! V iff M + V .
10.5 Operational equivalence
Informally, two terms M and N will be called operationally equivalent if M and
N are interchangeable as part of any larger program, without changing the ob-
servable behavior of the program. This notion of equivalence is also often called
observational equivalence, to emphasize the fact that it concentrates onobservable
properties of terms.
What is an observable behavior of a program? Normally, what we observe about a
program is its output, such as the characters it prints to a terminal. Since any such
characters can be converted in principle to natural numbers, we take the point
of view that the observable behavior of a program is a natural number which it
evaluates to. Similarly, if a program computes a boolean, we regard the boolean
value as observable. However, we do not regard abstract values, such as functions,
as being directly observable, on the grounds that a function cannot be observed
until we supply it some arguments and observe the result.
Deﬁnition. An observable type is either bool or nat. A result is a closed value
of observable type. Thus, a result is either T, F, or n. A program is a closed term
of observable type.
A context is a term with a hole, written C[ ]. Formally, the class of contexts is
deﬁned by a BNF:
C[ ] ::= [ ] x C[ ]N MC[ ] xA:C[ ] :::
and so on, extending through all the cases in the deﬁnition of a PCF term.
Well-typed contexts are deﬁned in the same way as well-typed terms, where it
is understood that the hole also has a type. The free variables of a context are
deﬁned in the same way as for terms. Moreover, we deﬁne the captured variables
of a context to be those bound variables whose scope includes the hole. So for
instance, in the context (x:[ ])(y:z), the variable x is captured, the variable z
is free, and y is neither free nor captured.
82If C[ ] is a context and M is a term of the appropriate type, we write C[M] for
the result of replacing the hole in the context C[ ] by M. Here, we do not -
rename any bound variables, so that we allow free variables of M to be captured
by C[ ].
We are now ready to state the deﬁnition of operational equivalence.
Deﬁnition. Two terms M;N are operationallyequivalent, in symbolsM =op N,
if for all closed and closing context C[ ] of observable type and all values V ,
C[M] + V ( ) C[N] + V:
Here, by a closing context we mean that C[ ] should capture all the free variables
of M and N. This is equivalent to requiring that C[M] and C[N] are closed terms
of observable types, i.e., programs. Thus, two terms are equivalent if they can be
used interchangeably in any program.
10.6 Operational approximation
As a reﬁnement of operational equivalence, we can also deﬁne a notion of opera-
tional approximation: We say that M operationally approximates N, in symbols
M vop N, if for all closed and closing contexts C[ ] of observable type and all
values V ,
C[M] + V ) C[N] + V:
Note that this deﬁnition includes the case where C[M] diverges, but C[N] con-
verges, for some N. This formalizes the notion that N is “more deﬁned” than M.
Clearly, we have M =op N iff M vop N and N vop M. Thus, we get a partial
order vop on the set of all terms of a given type, modulo operational equivalence.
Also, this partial order has a least element, namely if we let 
 = Y(x:x), then

 vop N for any term N of the appropriate type.
Note that, in general, vop is not a complete partial order, due to missing limits of
!-chains.
10.7 Discussion of operational equivalence
Operational equivalence is a very useful concept for reasoning about programs,
and particularly for reasoning about program fragments. If M and N are opera-
tionally equivalent, then we know that we can replace M by N in any program
83without affecting its behavior. For example, M could be a slow, but simple sub-
routine for sorting a list. N could be a replacement which runs much faster. If we
can prove M and N to be operationally equivalent, then this means we can safely
use the faster routine instead of the slower one.
Another example are compiler optimizations. Manycompilers will tryto optimize
the code that they produce, to eliminate useless instructions, to avoid duplicate
calculations, etc. Such an optimization often means replacing a piece of code M
by another piece of code N, without necessarily knowing much about the context
in which M is used. Such a replacement is safe if M and N are operationally
equivalent.
Ontheotherhand, operationalequivalenceis a somewhat problematic notion. The
problem is that the concept is not stable under adding new language features. It
can happen that two terms, M and N, are operationally equivalent, but when a
new feature is added to the language, they become unequivalent, even if M and N
do not use the new feature. The reason is the operational equivalence is deﬁned in
terms of contexts. Adding new features to a language also means that there will
be new contexts, and these new contexts might be able to distinguish M and N.
This can be a problem in practice. Certain compiler optimizations might be sound
for a sequential language, but might become unsound if new language features are
added. Code which used to be correct might suddenly become incorrect if used
in a richer environment. For example, many programs and library functions in C
assume that they are executed in a single-threaded environment. If this code is
ported to a multi-threaded environment, it often turns out to be no longer correct,
and in many cases it must be re-written from scratch.
10.8 Operational equivalence and parallel or
Let us now look at a concrete example in PCF. We say that a term POR imple-
ments the parallel or function if it has the following behavior:
POR TP ! T; for all P
POR NT ! T; for all N
POR FF ! F:
Note that this in particular implies POR T
 = T and POR 
T = T, where 

is some divergent term. It should be clear why POR is called the “parallel” or:
the only way to achieve such behavior is to evaluate both its arguments in parallel,
and to stop as soon as one argument evaluates to T or both evaluate to F.
84Proposition 10.7. POR is not deﬁnable in PCF.
We do not give the proof of this fact, but the idea is relatively simple: one proves
by induction that every PCF context C[ ; ] with two holes has the following
property: either, there exists a term N such that C[M;M 0] = N for all M;M 0
(i.e., the context does not look at M;M 0 at all), or else, either C[
;M] diverges
for all M, or C[M;
] diverges for all M. Here, again, 
 is some divergent term
such as Y(x:x).
Although POR is not deﬁnable in PCF, we can deﬁne the following term, called
the POR-tester:
POR-test = x:if xT
then
if x
Tthen
if xFFthen 

else T
else 

else 

The POR-tester has the property that POR-test M = T if M implements the
parallel or function, and in all other cases POR-test M diverges. In particular,
sinceparallelorisnotdeﬁnableinPCF,wehavethatPOR-test M diverges,forall
PCF terms M. Thus, when applied to any PCF term, POR-test behaves precisely
as thefunctionx:
 does. Onecanmakethis intoarigorious argumentthat shows
that POR-test and x:
 are operationally equivalent:
POR-test =op x:
 (in PCF):
Now, suppose we want to deﬁne an extension of PCF called parallel PCF. It
is deﬁned in exactly the same way as PCF, except that we add a new primitive
function POR, and small-step reduction rules
M ! M0 N ! N0
POR MN ! POR M 0N0
POR TN ! T
POR MT ! T
POR FF ! F
85Parallel PCF enjoys many of the same properties as PCF, for instance, Lem-
mas 10.1–10.3 and Proposition 10.4 continue to hold for it.
But notice that
POR-test 6=op x:
 (in parallel PCF):
This is becausethe context C[ ] = [ ]POR distinguishes the two terms: clearly,
C[POR-test] + T, whereas C[x:
] diverges.
10.9 Denotational semantics of PCF
The denotational semantics of PCF is deﬁned in terms of cpo’s. It extends the cpo
semantics of the simply-typed lambda calculus. Again, we assign a cpo [[A]] to
each PCF type A, and a continuous function
[[  ` M : B]] : [[ ]] ! [[B]]
to every PCF typing judgment. The interpretation is deﬁned in precisely the same
way as for the simply-typed lambda calculus. The interpretation for the PCF-
speciﬁc terms is shown in Table 8. Recall that B and N are the cpos of lifted
booleans and lifted natural numbers, respectively, as shown in Figure 4.
Deﬁnition. Two PCF terms M and N of equal types are denotationally equiv-
alent, in symbols M =den N, if [[M]] = [[N]]. We also write M vden N if
[[M]] v [[N]].
10.10 Soundness and adequacy
We have now deﬁned the three notions of equivalence on terms: = ax, =op, and
=den. In general, one does not expect the three equivalences to coincide. For
example, any two divergent terms are operationally equivalent, but there is no
reason why they should be axiomatically equivalent. Also, the POR-tester and
the term x:
 are operationally equivalent in PCF, but they are not denotationally
equivalent (since a function representing POR clearly exists in the cpo semantics).
For general terms M and N, one has the following property:
Theorem 10.8 (Soundness). For PCF terms M and N, the following implica-
tions hold:
M =ax N ) M =den N ) M =op N:
86Types: [[bool]] = B
[[nat]] = N
Terms: [[T]] = T 2 B
[[F]] = F 2 B
[[zero]] = 0 2 N
[[succ(M)]] =

? if [[M]] = ?,
n + 1 if [[M]] = n
[[pred(M)]] =
8
<
:
? if [[M]] = ?,
0 if [[M]] = 0,
n if [[M]] = n + 1
[[iszero(M)]] =
8
<
:
? if [[M]] = ?,
T if [[M]] = 0,
F if [[M]] = n + 1
[[if M then N else P]] =
8
<
:
? if [[M]] = ?,
[[N]] if [[M]] = F,
[[P]] if [[M]] = T,
[[Y(M)]] = [[M]]y
Table 8: Cpo semantics of PCF
87Soundness is a very useful property, because M =ax N is in general easier to
prove than M =den N, and M =den N is in turns easier to prove than M =op N.
Thus, soundness gives us a powerful proof method: to prove that two terms are
operationally equivalent, it sufﬁces to show that they are equivalent in the cpo
semantics (if they are), or even that they are axiomatically equivalent.
As the above examples show, the converse implications are not in general true.
However, the converse implications hold if the terms M and N are closed and
of observable type, and if N is a value. This property is called computational
adequacy. Recall that a program is a closed term of observable type, and a result
is a closed value of observable type.
Theorem 10.9(Computational Adequacy). If M is a program andV is a result,
then
M =ax V ( ) M =den V ( ) M =op V:
Proof. First note that the small-step semantics is contained in the axiomatic se-
mantics, i.e., if M ! N, then M =ax N. This is easily shown by induction on
derivations of M ! N.
To prove the theorem, by soundness, it sufﬁces to show that M =op V implies
M =ax V . So assume M =op V . Since V + V and V is of observable type, it
follows that M + V . Therefore M ! V by Proposition 10.6. But this already
implies M =ax V , and we are done. 
10.11 Full abstraction
We have already seen that the operational and denotational semantics do not co-
incide for PCF, i.e., there are some terms such that M =op N but M 6=den N.
Examples of such terms are POR-test and x:
.
But of course, the particular denotational semantics that we gave to PCF is not the
only possible denotational semantics. One can ask whether there is a better one.
For instance, instead of cpo’s, we could have used some other kind of mathemati-
cal space, such as a cpo with additional structure or properties, or some other kind
of object altogether. The search for good denotational semantics is a subject of
much research. The following terminology helps in deﬁning precisely what is a
“good” denotational semantics.
Deﬁnition. A denotational semantics is called fully abstract if for all terms M
and N,
M =den N ( ) M =op N:
88If the denotational semantics involves a partial order (such as a cpo semantics), it
is also called order fully abstract if
M vden N ( ) M vop N:
The search for a fully abstract denotational semantics for PCF was an open prob-
lem for a very long time. Milner proved that there could be at most one such
fully abstract model in a certain sense. This model has a syntactic description
(essentially the elements of the model are PCF terms), but for a long time, no
satisfactory semantic description was known. The problem has to do with sequen-
tiality: a fully abstract model for PCF must be able to account for the fact that
certain parallel constructs, such as parallel or, are not deﬁnable in PCF. Thus, the
model should consist only of “sequential” functions. Berry and others developed
a theory of “stable domain theory”, which is based on cpo’s with a additional
properties intended to capture sequentiality. This research led to many interesting
results, but the model still failed to be fully abstract.
Finally, in 1992, two competing teams of researchers, Abramsky, Jagadeesan and
Malacaria, and Hyland and Ong, succeeded in giving a fully abstract semantics
for PCF in terms of games and strategies. Games capture the interaction between
a player and an opponent, or between a program and its environment. By consid-
ering certain kinds of “history-free” strategies, it is possible to capture the notion
of sequentiality in just the right way to match PCF. In the last decade, game se-
mantics has been extended to give fully abstract semantics to a variety of other
programming languages, including, for instance, Algol-like languages.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the problem with “parallel or” is essentially
the only obstacle to full abstraction for the cpo semantics. As soon as one adds
“parallel or” to the language, the semantics becomes fully abstract.
Theorem 10.10. The cpo semantics is fully abstract for parallel PCF.
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